



“ROMEO AND ROMEO”:                                                     
AN EXAMINATION OF LIMON V. KANSAS                   
IN LIGHT OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 
Shulamit H. Shvartsman∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It was viewed as a “historic ruling,”1 a “sweeping, landmark 
victory,”2 affirming gay rights3 and opening many doors,4 including 
establishing rights in the military,5 ending homosexual 
discrimination,6 and even paving the road to homosexual marriage.7  
 
 ∗ J.D. candidate, May 2005, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. History, 
2001, Binghamton University. 
 1 Jerry Elmer, A Victory for Gay Rights in Lawrence v. Texas, 52 R.I. BAR J. 5, 5 
(2003). 
 2 Andrew Cohen, Sodomy Ruling’s Ripple Effect (June 26, 2003), at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/06/26/news/opinion/courtwatch/main560
593.shtml.  The Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund claimed it was “the most 
significant ruling ever for lesbian and gay Americans.”  Liberty Press, Sodomy Law 
Struck Down, U.S. Supreme Court Finds Texas Homosexual Conduct Law Unconstitutional 
(July 3, 2003), available at http://www.libertypress.net/archives/ksjuly03.html 
[hereinafter Sodomy Law Struck Down]. 
 3 Elmer, supra note 1. 
 4 See Patti Waldmeir, Big Eye on the Little Guy, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2004, at 16. 
In a decision that has already become a major political issue for 
President Bush, the court ruled, in the broadest possible terms, that 
homosexuals have rights too.  Up to a point, most of America would 
agree with that statement.  But the ruling went beyond that point, 
opening the door – despite its disclaimers – to full legalisation of 
homosexual relationships, including gay and lesbian marriage. 
Id. 
 5 Martha Lleder, Lawrence Decision Launches Military ‘Gay’ Ban Challenges, 
Concerned Women for America (July 16, 2003), at 
http://www.cultureandfamily.org/articledisplay.asp?id=4275&department=CFI&cate
goryid=cfreport. 
 6  
This ruling effectively strikes down the sodomy laws in every state that 
still has them . . . . But its impact is even broader - for decades, these 
laws have been a major roadblock to equality.  They’ve labeled the 
entire gay community as criminals and second-class citizens.  Today 
[June 26], the Supreme Court ended that once and for all. 
Sodomy Law Struck Down, supra note 2 (quoting Ruth Harlow, Legal Director at 
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“The ruling closed the door on an era of intolerance and ushered in 
a new era of respect and equal treatment for gay Americans . . . . [It] 
is the most important civil rights decision handed down by the court 
in a generation.”8 
The above statements describe the sentiment after Lawrence v. 
Texas,9 in which the United States Supreme Court held that it is no 
longer a crime to engage in homosexual sodomy.10  However, within a 
few months, it became obvious that the Lawrence decision “may turn 
out not to be quite the legal earthquake many anticipated.”11  While 
the Lawrence decision has many possible implications, this Comment 
focuses on the impact the Lawrence decision will have on teenage 
homosexual sexual relations, specifically, what bearing the case is 
expected to have on Matthew Limon, a Kansas teenager incarcerated 
for 206 months for engaging in homosexual activity.12 
 
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund and lead counsel on the Lawrence case) 
(alteration in original).  See also Jack Siu, 365Gay.com Newsmaker of 2003: John Lawrence 
and Tyron Garner (Dec. 21, 2003), at 
http://www.365gay.com/newscontent/2003Review/2003Newsmaker.htm. The 
Lawrence decision “has become a powerful tool for gay people in all 50 states where 
gay [people] continue fighting to be treated equally.  Sodomy laws criminalized oral 
and anal sex by consenting gay couples and in some states heterosexual couples but 
[were] used almost exclusively to justify discrimination against [homosexual 
people].”  Id. 
 7 See The Next Battle: Gay Marriage (June 30, 2003), at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/07/02/national/printable561385.shtml 
(“The landmark Lawrence v. Texas decision, which threw out a Texas law banning 
sodomy and similar statutes in 13 states, was widely seen as the prelude to a 
discussion of gay marriage.”).  “‘This ruling starts an entirely new chapter in our fight 
for equality for lesbians and gay men,’ Ruth Harlow . . . said.”  Sodomy Law Struck 
Down, supra note 2.  “Though not decided upon equal protection grounds, the 
majority decision still calls into question other legal limitations on the rights of 
homosexuals, including the right to state recognition of homosexual marriages, and 
the right to serve in the military.”  NationMaster.com, Encyclopedia: Lawrence v. 
Texas, at http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Lawrence-v.-Texas (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2004).  See also Justice Scalia’s dissent: “[W]hat justification could 
there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples . . . .”  
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 8 Siu, supra note 6. 
 9 539 U.S. 558. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Joseph Landau, Misjudged: What Lawrence Hasn’t Wrought, THE NEW REPUBLIC, 
Feb. 16, 2004, at 16. 
 12 Some fear that Lawrence will result in Limon’s release.  “It appears that age-of-
consent laws that differentiate between heterosexual and homosexual sex may be 
another casualty of the U.S. Supreme Court decision striking down Texas’ law 
banning homosexual acts.”  Lawrence Decision Opens Way for Legal Teen Sodomy, 
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Shortly after his eighteenth birthday, Matthew Limon was caught 
engaging in consensual13 sexual activities with a minor.14  M.A.R., his 
“victim,” was just short of fifteen years of age at the time of the 
activity.15  Kansas criminalizes the engagement in sexual activities with 
a child under the age of sixteen.16  As a result, Limon was convicted 
under Kansas’s criminal sodomy statute,17 which defines criminal 
sodomy as “sodomy with a child who is 14 or more years of age but 
less than 16 years of age.”18  Limon’s sentence for this offense is 
seventeen years.19  
Recognizing that teenage sexual experimentation should not be 
punished as severely as other statutory rape, Kansas has instituted a 
so-called “Romeo and Juliet” law,20 which serves as a mitigating statute 
 
 13 “M.A.R. consented to the oral-genital contact; upon request of M.A.R., the 
defendant stopped oral contact with the victim.”  Brief for Petitioner at 30a, Limon v. 
Kansas, 41 P.3d 303 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) (No. 00CR36) at 
http://archive.aclu.org/court/limon_cert.pdf [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].  
The Brief for Petitioner will be cited because various documents in the case are not 
otherwise available (i.e., the Transcript of Hearing Upon Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss, Stipulation of Facts, Transcript of Trial to the Court, Transcript of 
Continuation of Sentencing, Memorandum Opinion, Order Denying Motion for 
Rehearing of Modification, and the Order Denying Petition for Review). 
 14 Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup; Justices Extend Decision on Gay Rights 
and Equality, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2003, at 10.  See also Brief for Petitioner at 3a, Limon 
(No. 00CR36). 
 15 Brief for Petitioner at 30a, Limon (No. 00CR36). 
 16 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (2002).  Kansas, like many other states, has age of 
consent laws for sexual activities. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-9 (2002) (age of consent is 
sixteen); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11 (2003) (age of consent is seventeen); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 18.2-63 (2003) (age of consent is fifteen); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
9A.44.093 (2003) (age of consent is eighteen).  For an interesting discussion of age 
of consent laws and their implications, see Kate Sutherland, From Jailbird to Jailbait: 
Age of Consent Laws and the Construction of Teenage Sexualities, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN 
& L. 313 (2003).  See also infra Part V for discussion of consent. 
 17 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505. 
 18 Id. at § 21-3505(a)(2).  Note that oral sex is a form of sodomy under this 
statute.  Id. 
 19 See ‘Romeo & Juliet Law’ Gives Gay Teen 16 Years More in Prison than Heterosexual 
Would Serve, American Civil Liberties Union (Sept. 28, 2001), at 
http://archive.aclu.org/news/2001/n092801a.html. 
 20 Unlawful Voluntary Sexual Relations, KAN. STAT. ANN.  § 21-3522 (2002).  This 
statute 
is popularly known in Kansas as the ‘Romeo and Juliet Law.’  This 
refers to Shakespeare’s literary masterpiece whose central story 
concerns the love between a noble 13-year-old Veronese maiden, and a 
youthful Veronese nobleman just a few years older than she.  The 
purpose of the statute is to recognize the judgment that consensual 
sexual activity between a young adult and not-quite adult, although 
wrong, is not as criminal as sexual activity between persons farther in 
age. 
Brief for Petitioner at 6a-7a, Limon (No. 00CR36).  This law “was passed in 1999 to 
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when both actors are close in age.21  To trigger the Romeo and Juliet 
law, the offender must be less than nineteen years of age, the 
offender must be less than four years older than the child, the child 
and the offender must be the only parties involved in the sexual act, 
and both members must be of the opposite sex.22  If all factors are 
met, then the statute applies, reducing the prison penalty from a 
maximum of seventeen years to a maximum of fifteen months.23 
Limon, at the time of the sexual conduct, had just turned 
eighteen;24 the age difference between the two actors was just over 
three years; there is no allegation that anyone, other than Limon and 
M.A.R., was involved in the conduct.25  Thus, all of the factors 
necessary to trigger Kansas’s Romeo and Juliet law were present, 
except for one—M.A.R. and Limon were both males, thus not 
“members of the opposite sex.”26  As a result, the Romeo and Juliet 
law did not apply,27 and Limon was prosecuted and convicted under 
the harsher criminal sodomy statute.28  The difference between the 
two punishments is almost sixteen years.29 
Limon has already served over three years of his prison sentence 
 
separate consensual teenage sexual relationships from cases in which older adults 
exploited young children.”  Chris Grenz, Prospects for Change in Laws Appear Poor, 
TOPEKA CAP. – J. (Kan.), Feb. 15, 2003, at 7, available at 2003 WL 6855385. 
 21 See Deb Price, Courts Need to Apply Same Rules to All, DETROIT NEWS, Jan. 13, 
2003, at 7.  Kansas has a “‘Romeo and Juliet’ law – a sort of get-out-of-jail-free card 
that many state legislatures give similarly aged sexually active teens while rightly 
applying serious penalties against adults who have sex with minors.”  Id. 
 22 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3522(a). 
 23 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3522.  Greenhouse, supra note 14, at 10.  See also Brief for 
Petitioner at 3, Limon (No. 00CR36). 
 24 Greenhouse, supra note 14, at 10.  See also Brief for Petitioner at 4a, Limon (No. 
00CR36). 
 25 See Brief for Petitioner at 39a, Limon (No. 00CR36). 
 26 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3522(a). 
 27 “Well, unfortunately for Limon, Kansas’s Romeo and Juliet law is meant to be 
taken literally.  It applies only to Romeos and Juliets, not to Romeos and Mercutios.  
It was explicitly written to exclude application in cases involving same-sex activity.”  
Michael Bronski, The Other Matthew, BOSTON PHOENIX, Feb. 20, 2003, at 
http://www.bostonphoenix.com/boston/news_features/other_stories/documents/0
2704491.htm. 
 28 Limon was convicted under KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505. 
 29 See ‘Romeo & Juliet Law’ Gives Gay Teen 16 Years More in Prison than Heterosexual 
Would Serve, supra note 19.  Matt Coles, Director of the American Civil Liberties 
Union  (“ACLU”) Lesbian & Gay Rights Project, which filed a friend-of-the-court 
brief on Limon’s behalf stated: 
The only difference between a year in jail and 17 years is whether or 
not you’re gay . . . . Matt Limon will be 36 years old by the time he’s 
released, having spent half of his life in prison—while a heterosexual 
person would have been released before turning 19. 
Id. 
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and has over a decade left to serve.  Under Bowers v. Hardwick,30 which 
held there is no fundamental right to engage in sodomy, Limon had 
a slim chance of release; however, Limon now may have new hope for 
an early release, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s recent 
“landmark”31 decision in Lawrence v. Texas.32  The Lawrence decision 
overruled Bowers v. Hardwick33 and has opened many doors, perhaps 
even in Limon’s case.34  Just one day after the Lawrence decision, the 
United States Supreme Court instructed the Kansas Court of Appeals 
to re-examine Limon’s case.35  Oral arguments took place on 
December 2, 2003;36 however, in the following month, the Kansas 
Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, affirmed his conviction.37  
Limon’s attorney challenged this decision in the Kansas Supreme 
Court, which granted a petition for review on May 25, 2004.38  
Depending on the outcome in the Kansas Supreme Court, the 
United States Supreme Court may be the next venue to hear this 
case.39 
Initially, the Kansas Court of Appeals relied on Bowers when 
sentencing Limon;40 because Lawrence overruled Bowers, Lawrence now 
serves as the new precedent.41  The United States Supreme Court 
 
 30 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 31 Charles Lane, Justices Overturn Texas Sodomy Ban, Ruling is Landmark Victory for 
Gay Rights, WASH. POST, June 27, 2003, at A01. 
 32 539 U.S. 558. 
 33 478 U.S. 186. 
 34 See Lane, supra note 31, at A01 (quoting Elizabeth Birch, executive director of 
the Human Rights Campaign, a leading gay rights organization, “This is an historic 
day for fair-minded Americans everywhere.  This ruling opens the door for new 
advances toward full equality.”). 
 35 In a very brief decision, the Supreme Court simply stated: “On petition for writ 
of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Kansas.  Petition for writ of certiorari granted.  
Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the Court of Appeals of Kansas for further 
consideration in light of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. [558] (2003).”  Limon v. 
Kansas, 539 U.S. 955 (2003). 
 36 Appeal Begins for Teen Sentenced to Prison for Gay Sex (Dec. 2, 2003), at 
http://www.365gay.com/newscontent/120203limonAppeal.htm. 
 37 Kansas v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004). 
 38 Kansas v. Limon, No. 00-85898-AS, 2004 Kan. LEXIS 284, at *1 (Kan. May 25, 
2004). 
 39 See Stephanie Francis Ward, Avoiding Lawrence: Courts Considering Last Year’s 
Major Gay Rights Ruling are Treading Carefully, 90 A.B.A.J. 16 (June 2004) (stating that 
the United States Supreme Court may take this case). 
 40 The Kansas Court of Appeals relied on Bowers, now overruled, and held: “The 
impact of Bowers on [this] case is obvious . . . . [T]here is no denial of equal 
protection when [homosexual] behavior is criminalized or treated differently . . . .”  
Brief for Petitioner at 12a, Limon (No. 00CR36). 
 41 “. . . Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.  It 
ought not to remain binding precedent.  Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is 
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recognized Lawrence’s implication on Limon’s case, thus instructing 
the Kansas Court of Appeals to reconsider Limon v. Kansas42 “in light 
of” Lawrence.43  Lawrence and its ambiguous language, however, 
support several different interpretations, and the Kansas Court of 
Appeals chose a narrow version.  Further, while opening the door, 
Lawrence leaves many unanswered questions.  Lawrence, after all, 
stands for the proposition that consenting adults have the right to 
privacy to engage in homosexual acts.44  It is questionable, and 
doubtful, that this right extends to minors.45  Precisely what effect, if 
at all, Lawrence will have on Limon remains to be seen.  Clearly, 
Lawrence has opened up some doors; nevertheless, many other 
barriers remain intact.46  Whether the Kansas Supreme Court will 
interpret Lawrence broadly or narrowly will be evident in the future.47  
If interpreted broadly, Limon may have a chance to be released; 
however, Lawrence may not have any impact on Limon’s case, other 
than its remand.  Thus, it remains to be seen how far the Lawrence 
case will extend and whether it is, indeed, a “landmark victory . . . 
[which] opens the door for new advances toward full equality.”48 
This Comment will address how Lawrence has affected and may 
 
overruled.”  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.  Precedent is defined as “1.  The making of law 
by a court in recognizing and applying new rules while administering justice.  2.  A 
decided case that furnishes a basis for determining later cases involving similar facts 
or issues.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1214 (8th ed. 2004). 
In law a precedent is an adjudged case or decision of a court of justice, 
considered as furnishing a rule or authority for the determination of 
an identical or similar case afterwards arising, or of a similar question 
of law.  The only theory on which it is possible for one decision to be 
an authority for another is that the facts are alike, or, if the facts are 
different, that the principle which governed the first case is applicable 
to the variant facts. 
WILLIAM M. LILE ET AL., BRIEF MAKING AND THE USE OF LAW BOOKS 288 (3d ed. 1914). 
 42 Kansas v. Limon, 41 P.3d 303 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002). 
 43 Limon v. Kansas, 539 U.S. 955. 
 44 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“[T]wo adults, who, with full and mutual consent 
from each other, engage[] in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle . . . 
are entitled to respect for their private lives.  The State cannot demean their 
existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.”). 
 45 “It appears that age-of-consent laws that differentiate between heterosexual 
and homosexual sex may be another casualty of the U.S. Supreme Court decision 
striking down Texas’ law banning homosexual acts.”  Lawrence Decision Opens Way for 
Legal Teen Sodomy, supra note 12.  See also discussion infra Part IV. 
 46 “. . . Lawrence may turn out not to be quite the legal earthquake many 
anticipated.”  Landau, supra note 11. 
 47 The Kansas Supreme Court granted Limon’s Petition for Review on May 25, 
2004.  Kansas v. Limon, No. 00-85898-AS, 2004 Kan. LEXIS 284, at *1 (Kan. May 25, 
2004). 
 48 See supra notes 31 and 34 and accompanying text. 
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affect Limon.  Part II will explain the decision of Limon v. Kansas.  Part 
III will explore the Lawrence v. Texas decision and its influence.  Part 
IV will then compare the two cases, suggesting that Lawrence may not 
be as helpful as commentators first believed, as there are several 
material differences between the cases.  Part V will then explore 
Lawrence’s unanswered questions as they pertain to Limon, posing 
whether Limon can be reversed regardless. 
In addition, this Comment highlights the importance of Limon.  
Limon is much more than a “test case.”  It serves three independent 
purposes.  First, Limon is essential in expounding the ambiguities of 
Lawrence.  Second, Limon shows that even post-Lawrence, states can 
implement indirect regulation (i.e., higher age of consent laws) to 
prevent homosexual activity.  If Limon is overturned, the decision 
would serve as a preventative measure against such intolerance.  
Lastly, Limon offers an opportunity to clarify Romer v. Evans,49 and 
determine what standard of scrutiny applies to laws involving 
homosexual classifications. 
II.  LIMON V. KANSAS 
In mid-February 2000, Limon and M.A.R., while residents of a 
group home for the developmentally disabled,50 engaged in 
consensual sexual activity.51  M.A.R., the “victim,” was over fourteen 
years of age at this time, but under sixteen.52  Matthew Limon, the 
defendant, just turned eighteen.53 
Had Limon engaged in this activity with a female, the conduct 
would have triggered the Romeo and Juliet law, giving him a 
maximum prison sentence of fifteen months.54  However, since 
Limon was a homosexual and engaged in sexual activity with another 
male, he did not receive protection under the Romeo and Juliet law.  
Kansas prosecuted Limon under the harsher criminal sodomy 
statute55 and sentenced him to seventeen years in prison.56  Limon 
 
 49 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 50 Chris Grenz, Kline Appears on National Talk Show, TOPEKA CAP. – J. (Kan.), Oct. 
1, 2003, at 7, available at 2003 WL 62492982.  While the fact that the two males were 
mentally disabled might have been significant, it did not play a role in the opinion, 
and will not be explored in this Comment. 
 51 See Brief for Petitioner at 30a, Limon (No. 00CR36). 
 52 See id. 
 53 See id.  The incident occurred precisely two weeks after Limon turned 18 
(Limon’s date of birth is February 2, 1982; the date of the sexual activity was 
February 16, 2000).  Id. 
 54 Grenz, supra note 50, at 7. 
 55 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505(a)(2). 
 56 Grenz, supra note 50, at 7. 
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essentially received sixteen more years for choosing to experiment 
with a male rather than a female.57 
Although Limon’s attorney tried to apply the Romeo and Juliet 
law to reduce Limon’s sentence,58 the district court refused to extend 
this protective statute to Limon because his partner was not of the 
opposite sex.59  The district court reasoned that the legislature “in its 
wisdom” chose to make the mitigating statute only applicable to 
heterosexual activity.60  The district court justified such actions, ruling 
that “classifications honestly designed to protect the public interests 
against evils which might otherwise occur are to be upheld unless 
they are unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive.”61  Applying this 
standard, the Kansas district court held that a state is empowered to 
protect children, and, if the state chooses, it can penalize 
heterosexual activity less severely than homosexual activity.62  Further, 
the district court upheld the Romeo and Juliet law on the basis that it 
does not “represent an invalid, illegitimate or improper exercise of 
the legislation of police power in the Kansas legislature.”63  Thus, the 
Kansas district court denied Limon’s motion to dismiss the charges 
and apply the Romeo and Juliet law.64 
Following a bench trial,65 the Kansas district court convicted 
Limon of one count of criminal sodomy, a “severity level 3 person 
felony.”66  Limon then sought a departure from the presumptive 
sentence to a prison term no longer than fourteen months, or in the 
alternative, a dispositional departure to probation.67  The district 
judge denied this request, asserting, “[T]here is not good and 
sufficient reason . . . to grant a departure.”68  The district court judge 
accordingly sentenced Limon to the custody of the Department of 
Corrections for 206 months.69 
The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed, per curiam, in a decision 
 
 57 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 58 Brief for Petitioner at 36a, Limon (No. 00CR36). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See id. 
 63 Id. at 37a-38a 
 64 Brief for Petitioner at 38a, Limon (No. 00CR36). 
 65 Limon waived a jury trial.  See id. at 27a. 
 66 Id. at 29a. 
 67 Id. at 21a.  Limon argued that to impose this sentence would violate his Eighth 
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments.  Id. 
 68 Id. at 17a. 
 69 Id. at 18a. 
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without a published opinion.70  Relying on Bowers v. Hardwick,71 the 
appellate court opined that homosexuals do not belong to a 
protected class, thus they do not receive the benefit of a strict scrutiny 
analysis.72  Further, this court claimed that “there is no present 
indication that the [Bowers] decision would be different today” or that 
the “United States Supreme Court or the Kansas Supreme Court 
would adopt the position taken by Limon.”73 
Limon appealed this decision to the Kansas Supreme Court, 
which denied his petition for review.74  The petition presented the 
following issue for review: 
Do laws that impose a 17-year prison sentence for consensual oral 
sex between teenagers of the same sex violate the Equal 
Protection Clause where the sentence would be no more than 15 
months if the teenagers were members of the opposite sex?75 
The Kansas Supreme Court refused to hear this case, and thus 
did not address the question of whether the Limon decision violates 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 
        Equal Protection Argument 
In his brief for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, 
Limon mainly argued that dramatically different penalties for 
identical acts of consensual sodomy between teenagers violates the 
Equal Protection Clause76 because the “sexual orientation of the 
defendant, rather than the conduct, determines which statute, and 
therefore which penalty, applies.”77  The penalties under the Romeo 
and Juliet law and sodomy statute not only differed, but the Romeo 
and Juliet statute set forth a much more lenient punishment.78  
Limon’s brief succinctly summarized the difference in treatment: 
 
 70 Brief for Petitioner at 3a, Limon (No. 00CR36). 
 71 478 U.S. 186. 
 72 Brief for Petitioner at 12a, Limon (No. 00CR36). 
 73 Id. at 9a, 12a. 
 74 Id. at 1a. 
 75 Id. (note that there is no page number; please refer to “Questions Presented” 
section of Brief). 
 76 Id. at 9-18. 
 77 Id. at 3. 
 78 Under the Romeo and Juliet law, the first and second offenses result in 
presumptive probation, and a third offense results in a maximum sentence of fifteen 
months.  Under the criminal sodomy statute, a first offense carries a presumptive 
sentence of 55-61 months, a second offense carries an 89-100 months sentence, and a 
third offense carries 206-228 months penalty.  Further, only a criminal sodomy 
statute violation is categorized as a sexually violent crime, which triggers mandatory 
sex offender status.  Brief for Petitioner at 3-4, Limon (No. 00CR36). 
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“Heterosexual teenagers who engage in consensual oral sex are 
punished under the Romeo and Juliet law, while gay teenagers who 
engage in consensual oral sex are treated as child molesters and are 
punished under Kansas’s criminal sodomy law.”79 
Further, Limon’s brief raised the policy implication of this law: 
Kansas, by limiting the mitigating statute to members of the same sex, 
“subjects gay teenagers to additional criminal penalties that are based 
not on any difference in their actions but on the State’s moral 
disapproval of their sexual orientation toward members of the 
opposite sex.”80  Limon added that, “[l]aws that single out gay 
teenagers for special criminal sanctions legitimize other forms of 
discrimination against gay teenagers and contribute to pervasive 
social prejudice that has severe psychological consequences for all gay 
teenagers . . . .”81 
In sum, Limon argued that the Romeo and Juliet law was 
unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection Clause.  His 
reasoning consisted of three arguments: (1) the Romeo and Juliet law 
benefits only heterosexuals; (2) Kansas law subjects homosexual 
teenagers to a much harsher penalty that is not based on the conduct 
itself, but instead is based on the sex of the person with whom they 
engaged in this conduct; and (3) because the conduct may be the 
same, the determinative factor in the inquiry of whether one gets the 
benefit of the Romeo and Juliet law is sexual orientation.82  Although 
Limon recognized a valid purpose for the Romeo and Juliet law,83 he 
argued that imposing harsher punishments based on sexual 
orientation does not advance legitimate state interests in promoting 
morality or protecting children.84 
Limon next reasoned that states cannot promote morality by 
punishing people for who they are.85  While a state is 
free to legislate to encourage people to act in ways the [s]tate 
believes are morally good and to discourage people from acting in 
ways the [s]tate believes are morally bad . . . it may not penalize 
one group of citizens more severely for the same acts merely 
 
 79 Id. at 4. 
 80 Id. at 10. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 The Romeo and Juliet law’s main purpose is “[t]o recognize the judgment that 
consensual sexual activity between a young adult and a not-quite adult, although 
wrong, is not as criminal as sexual activity between persons farther apart in age.”  Id. 
at 7a. 
 84 Brief for Petitioner at 13, Limon (No. 00CR36). 
 85 Id. at 13 (citing various cases). 
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because it disapproves of who they are; and it may not avoid the 
Equal Protection Clause by saying that its disapproval is based in 
morality.86 
Limon submitted a brief seeking certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court on October 10, 2002.87  The case remained dormant 
until June 27, 2003.  One day after the Lawrence decision, the United 
States Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari to the Court of 
Appeals of Kansas “for further consideration . . . .”88  Some viewed this 
action as “the first ripple effect of [a] landmark decision on gay 
rights.”89  In spite of this optimism, in January 2004, the Kansas Court 
of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, affirmed Limon’s conviction.90  The 
Kansas Court of Appeals held that the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lawrence did not apply to sexual acts involving children 
and that the court must grant deference to the legislature.91  The 
American Civil Liberties Union appealed the decision to the Kansas 
Supreme Court,92 which granted review on May 24, 2004.93 
How the Kansas Supreme Court will ultimately decide Limon and 
what impact Lawrence will have on it remains to be seen.  One 
prediction is that Lawrence will not affect Limon at all, since Lawrence 
was decided on different grounds than those challenged in the Limon 
case, granting a right to privacy only to consenting adults.94  Another 
prediction is that the Limon case will be greatly affected since 
Lawrence has “opened new doors” to many gay rights issues.95 
 
 86 Id. at 14 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954); U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973); Romer, 517 U.S. at 634; Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985)).  Prior to the Lawrence decision, 
there was a split in the lower courts over whether moral disapproval of homosexuality 
is a legitimate basis for discriminating.  The Lawrence decision resolves that split.  The 
Kansas Court of Appeals relied on Bowers, now overruled, and held: “The impact of 
Bowers on [this] case is obvious . . . . [T]here is no denial of equal protection when 
[homosexual] behavior is criminalized or treated differently.”  Id. at 23. 
 87 Id. 
 88 539 U.S. 955 (2003). 
 89 Charles Lane, Gay Rights Ruling Affects Kan. Case; 17-Year Term in Teen Sex Case at 
Issue, WASH. POST, June 28, 2003, at A08.  See also Greenhouse, supra note 14 (“In an 
immediate application of its new protective approach to gay rights, the Supreme 
Court today vacated the sodomy conviction of a Kansas teenager who received a 17-
year sentence for having oral sex with a younger boy.”). 
 90 Kansas v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Landau, supra note 11, at 16. 
 93 See supra note 38. 
 94 See infra Part IV. 
 95 Waldmeir, supra note 4, at 16. 
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III.  LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 
Lawrence is “touted as the most important case for gay rights in a 
generation.”96  It became the turning point in the Limon case, 
initiating its remand.97  The Court of Appeals of Kansas, in deciding 
Limon, based its reasoning on the Bowers principal—that there is no 
fundamental right to engage in homosexual acts.98  The significance 
of Lawrence lies in its reversal of Bowers v. Hardwick.99  Therefore any 
discussion of Lawrence must begin with an examination of that case. 
A. Bowers v. Hardwick 
In Bowers v. Hardwick,100 considered by some as an 
“embarrassment,”101 the Court upheld a Georgia statute criminalizing 
consensual sodomy102 and ruled that homosexuals do not have a 
fundamental right to privacy.103  In 1986, the State of Georgia charged 
Hardwick with violating its criminal sodomy statute104 after Georgia 
police discovered him in the bedroom of his home with another 
adult male.105  Following a preliminary hearing, the district attorney 
decided not to prosecute the case.106  Hardwick, however, brought suit 
in federal district court in Georgia, challenging the constitutionality 
of the statute that criminalized consensual sodomy.107 
Hardwick argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it 
placed him, as a homosexual, in imminent danger of arrest.108  The 
district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim.109  A divided Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the 
statute violated Hardwick’s fundamental rights because his 
 
 96 Mary Alice Robbins, High Court Set for Bowers Challenge, FULTON COUNTY DAILY 
REP., Mar. 24, 2003. 
 97 Appeal Begins for Teen Sentences to Prison for Gay Sex, supra note 36. 
 98 Brief for Petitioner at 11a, Limon (No. 00CR36). 
 99 478 U.S. 186. 
 100 Id. 
 101 See Robbins, supra note 96 (quoting Vivian Berger, professor emeritus at 
Columbia University Law School); see also Elmer, supra note 1, at 5 (“Bowers v. 
Hardwick, a dreadful ruling that easily earned its place in the pantheon of the all-time 
worst Supreme Court decisions, along with such other notable cases as Dred Scott v. 
Sanford . . . Plessy v. Ferguson . . . [and] Lochner v. New York . . . .”). 
 102 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984). 
 103 Bowers, 478 U.S. 186. 
 104 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2. 
 105 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187-88. 
 106 Id. at 188. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
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homosexual activity is “private and intimate association that is beyond 
the reach of state regulation by reason of the Ninth Amendment and 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”110  The 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.111 
In a 5-4 opinion, the United States Supreme Court reversed the 
Court of Appeals.112  The Court addressed the controversial issue of 
whether the Constitution confers a fundamental right upon 
homosexuals to engage in sodomy, thus making Georgia’s criminal 
sodomy statute invalid.113  Taking into consideration a deep-rooted 
historical and religious sentiment against sodomy, and after listing 
every state’s current legislation on this topic, the Court held that 
there is no fundamental right to engage in acts of consensual 
sodomy.114  The Court justified this ruling as necessary because “it 
would be difficult, except by fiat, to limit the claimed right to 
homosexual conduct while leaving exposed to prosecution adultery, 
incest, and other sexual crimes . . . . [The Court is] unwilling to start 
down that road.”115 
Justice Blackmun’s dissent provided a contrary view, recognizing 
that the case was not about a fundamental right to engage in 
homosexual sodomy, but rather “‘the most comprehensive of rights 
and the right most valued by civilized men,’ namely, ‘the right to be 
let alone.’”116  Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent,117 in which he 
pointed to a paradox—“our prior cases thus establish that a State may 
not prohibit sodomy within ‘the sacred precincts of marital 
bedrooms,’118 or, indeed, between unmarried heterosexual adults.”119  
 
 110 Id. at 189. 
 111 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari “because other 
Courts of Appeals have arrived at judgments contrary to that of the Eleventh Circuit.”  
Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 190. 
 114 Id. at 193-94. 
 115 Id. at 195-96; see id. at 196-97 (Burger, J., concurring) (“I write separately to 
underscore my view that in constitutional terms there is no such thing as a 
fundamental right to commit homosexual sodomy . . . . To hold that the act of 
homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast 
aside millennia of moral teaching.”).  See further id. at 198 (Powell, J., concurring) 
(“I cannot say that conduct condemned for hundreds of years has now become a 
fundamental right.”).  This policy argument, not to extend this rationale out of fear 
where it may lead, is seen again in Lawrence: “This reasoning leaves on pretty shaky 
grounds state laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples.”  539 U.S. at 601 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 116 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Olmstead v. United 
States, 227 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
 117 Id. at 214-20 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall). 
 118 Id. at 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
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Using this precedent, the Justice reasoned that it is rational to extend 
this protection to homosexual adults as well.120  Justice Stevens 
argued, “it is perfectly clear that the State of Georgia may not totally 
prohibit the conduct proscribed by § 16-6-2 of the Georgia Criminal 
Code.”121  The majority’s opinion in Lawrence v. Texas122 mostly 
referenced Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion in Bowers. 
B.  Bowers Overruled 
Commentators viewed Lawrence v. Texas123 as a “landmark victory” 
for gay rights124 that is “likely to become a milestone in U.S. law and 
culture.”125  The case began almost by accident when Harris County 
Sheriff’s officers entered an apartment in Houston, looking for what 
a neighbor had told them was a man with a gun “going crazy.”126  
Instead, the officers found Lawrence engaging in sexual activities 
with Garner.127  The police arrested the two men, held them in 
overnight custody, and charged and later convicted them of violating 
a Texas statute that prohibits sexual activity between members of the 
same sex.128 
The two men sought a trial de novo in Harris County Criminal 
 
479, 485 (1965)). 
 119 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 
(1972)). 
 120 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 121 Id. (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
 122 539 U.S. 558. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Lane, supra note 31, at A01. 
 125 Joan Biskupic, Decision Represents an Enormous Turn in the Law, U.S.A. TODAY, 
June 26, 2003, available at 2003 WL 5314286; see also Lane, supra note 31, at A01 
(stating: 
A court that charts a conservative path in so many areas of law reversed 
a 1986 decision that had hung darkly over the lives of gay men and 
lesbians—and reversed it with stunning vigor . . . . The ruling was 
anything but the narrow, cautious result many had expected in one of 
the most sensitive cases of the term.  Its logic seemed to be not just that 
the Constitution prohibits the government from regulating 
homosexual activity, but that the Constitution protects any sexual 
activity between consenting adults, unless the government can show 
that it has a legitimate interest in controlling it.). 
 126 Lane, supra note 31, at A01. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a)).  TEX. 
PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003) provides that a “person commits an offense if he 
engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex,” and § 
21.01(1) defines “deviate sexual intercourse” as “(A) any contact between any part of 
the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; or (B) the 
penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object.” 
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Court, challenging the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and of similar provisions in the 
Texas Constitution.129  The Texas Court of Appeals rejected both 
claims.130  A Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, heard the federal 
constitutional arguments of Lawrence and Garner.131  In a divided 
opinion, the Court of Appeals rejected these arguments and affirmed 
the convictions.132  The United States Supreme Court then granted 
certiorari.133 
The Court considered three questions upon review of the case: 
(1) whether the Texas law criminalizing sexual intimacy by same-sex 
couples violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment; (2) whether the petitioners’ criminal convictions for 
adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violated their liberty 
and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment; and (3) whether Bowers v. Hardwick134 should be 
overruled.135 
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy analyzed the case using 
only the Due Process Clause.136  The opinion explored the evolving 
case history of the right to privacy, beginning with Griswold v. 
Connecticut,137 which established a right of marital privacy in the 
bedroom.138  The Court then turned to Eisenstadt v. Baird,139 which 
extended this right beyond the marital relationship.140  Next, the 
Court cited Roe v. Wade,141 which extended Due Process protection to 
women by giving them the right to make fundamental decisions.142  
 
 129 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 536.  Ruth Harlow, lead attorney for Lawrence and 
Garner, and legal director for Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund said: 
“We’re pursuing this case because they were just astounded that the state of Texas 
could do this to them.”  Robbins, supra note 96. 
 130 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563. 
 131 The two constitutional claims were Equal Protection and Due Process. 
 132 Lawrence v. Texas, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App. 2001). 
 133 537 U.S. 1044 (2002). 
 134 478 U.S. 186. 
 135 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. 
 136 “We conclude the case should be resolved by determining whether the 
petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of 
their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution.”  Id. at 564. 
 137 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 138 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-66 (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. 479). 
 139 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 140 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565 (citing Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438). 
 141 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 142 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. 113). 
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Lastly, the Court relied on Carey v. Population Services International,143 
which addressed a statute forbidding sale or distribution of 
contraceptives to persons under sixteen,144 and held that the 
reasoning of Griswold could not be confined to the protection of the 
rights of married adults.145  Based on this line of reasoning, the Court 
concluded that Garner and Lawrence deserve the same protection.146  
The Court reasoned that if sodomy is legal between two consenting 
married adults, it must also be legal for non-married adults, including 
homosexuals.147 
After analyzing this case development, the Court presented 
evidence showing that the historical analysis on which the Bowers 
Court based its decision had changed drastically.148  After a critique of 
Bowers, the Court concluded that its rationale does not “withstand 
careful analysis” and ruled that “Bowers was not correct when it was 
decided, and it is not correct today.  It ought not to remain binding 
precedent . . . . [It] should be and now is overruled.” 149 
Justice O’Connor, a member of the Bowers majority, wrote a 
separate concurring opinion.  She agreed with the judgment “that 
Texas’ sodomy law banning ‘deviate sexual intercourse’ between 
consenting adults of the same sex, but not between consenting adults 
of different sexes, is unconstitutional.”150  However, rather than 
relying on the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, as the 
majority did, Justice O’Connor based her conclusion on the 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.151 
 
 143 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
 144 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566 (citing Carey, 431 U.S. 678). 
 145 Id. at 566. 
 146 See id. at 579 (“The case . . . involve[s] two adults who . . . engaged in sexual 
practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.  The petitioners are entitled to respect 
for their private lives.  The State cannot demean their existence or control their 
destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.”). 
 147 See id. at 567 (“The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual 
persons the right to make this [sexual and relationship] choice.”). 
 148 The Court cited the American Law Institute as well as European sources 
invalidating these types of sodomy laws.  In addition, the Court put forth statistics 
showing that the twenty-four states with laws prohibiting this conduct at the time of 
Bowers have now been reduced to thirteen, four of which only enforce their laws 
against homosexual conduct.  See id. at 569-74.  Further, even in these states, people 
are not commonly prosecuted.  See id. at 573. 
 149 Id. at 577-78 (adding, in light of the harsh criticism of Bowers, that “[t]he 
present case does not involve minors . . . . The case does involve two adults . . . .”  Id. at 
578 (emphasis added)). 
 150 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  The Georgia statute 
criminalizes all sodomy.  Id. 
 151 Id. at 579-80 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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C. Justice O’Connor’s Concurrence and Limon 
Because Matthew Limon brought an Equal Protection challenge, 
the majority’s Due Process decision in Lawrence is not directly on 
point.  Thus, in Limon’s case, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in 
Lawrence may be the most pertinent part of the opinion because it 
addresses Equal Protection.  In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor 
agreed with the majority that Texas’s sodomy law is 
unconstitutional.152  As stated previously, however, rather than 
analyzing the case in terms of Due Process, as the majority did, Justice 
O’Connor based her conclusion on the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.153 
Justice O’Connor began her opinion by noting that the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates that “all 
persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”154  Next, using a 
rational basis standard of review, Justice O’Connor stated that 
“legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the 
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate 
state interest.”155  Justice O’Connor further explained that “[w]hen a 
law exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we 
have applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike 
down such laws under the Equal Protection Clause.”156  The Justice 
remarked that, as a general rule, the Court will apply rational basis 
review and hold a law unconstitutional where it inhibits personal 
relationships.157  Thus, she concluded, “Texas’ sodomy law would not 
pass scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, regardless of the 
type of rational basis review that we apply.”158 
Justice O’Connor had two main reasons to support her 
conclusion.  First, she reasoned that because the Texas statute makes 
sodomy a crime only if the actors are of the same sex, it proves that 
Texas treats the same conduct differently based solely on the sexual 
orientation of the participants.159  Second, Justice O’Connor 
distinguished Lawrence from Bowers, asserting that moral disapproval 
is an insufficient governmental interest to satisfy rational basis review 
 
 152 Id. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 153 Id. at 579-80 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 154 Id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 155 Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 156 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 157 Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 158 Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 159 Id. at 581 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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under the Equal Protection Clause.160  Because Texas banned only 
homosexual sodomy and not heterosexual sodomy, Justice O’Connor 
concluded that Texas, in effect, was acting solely out of moral 
disapproval of a politically unpopular group. 
It would seem that an application of Justice O’Connor’s Equal 
Protection analysis to Limon would lead to the conclusion that the 
Kansas Romeo and Juliet law is unconstitutional.  As in Lawrence, 
Limon involves a much harsher penalty based solely on the sex of the 
participants, and the state relies on moral disapproval as a legitimate 
state interest to justify that penalty.  Justice O’Connor, however, 
cautioned: 
That this law as applied to private, consensual conduct is 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause does not 
mean that other laws distinguishing between heterosexuals and 
homosexuals would similarly fail under rational basis review.  
Texas cannot assert any legitimate state interest here, such as 
national security or preserving the traditional institution of 
marriage.161 
Thus, Justice O’Connor declared that such statutes, which 
distinguish between homosexuals and heterosexuals, are not invalid 
per se, as long as they serve some legitimate state interest.  As a result, 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion, while influential, is not completely 
applicable to the Limon case because she differentiated this law from 
other circumstances where the law may be valid; for instance, laws 
involving minors.162  Further, even if applicable, Justice O’Connor’s 




 160 Id. at 582-83 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 161 Id. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 162 Lawrence also had a dissenting opinion.  Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas) argued that the majority’s opinion is false because 
Texas’s prohibition of sodomy neither infringes upon a “fundamental right,” nor is it 
unsupported by a rational relation to what the Constitution considers a legitimate 
state interest.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 594-99 (Scalia, J. dissenting).  Further, Justice 
Scalia disagreed with Justice O’Connor, claiming that the Texas statute does not 
deny equal protection under the laws.  Id. at 604-605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Most 
interestingly, Justice Scalia remarks that “[t]oday’s opinion is the product of a Court, 
which is the product of a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-
called homosexual agenda . . . .”  Id. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas 
also filed a dissent, remarking that this law is “uncommonly silly” and if it were up to 
him, he would repeal it; however, his dissent lies with the fact that there is no right to 
privacy in the Constitution or the Bill of Rights.  Id. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
  
2004 COMMENT 377 
IV.  LIMON AND LAWRENCE: A COMPARISON 
Because Justice O’Connor based her opinion in Lawrence on 
Equal Protection, it appears more on point than the majority’s Due 
Process analysis, and thus is more favorable to Limon’s case; yet, it is 
important to note that it is a concurrence, and not binding 
precedent.163  Because the Lawrence majority based its opinion on due 
process, liberty and privacy rather than on equal protection,164 the 
precise effect the Lawrence decision will have on Limon, an equal 
protection case, remains to be seen.165  While Lawrence undoubtedly 
helps Limon166 and gay rights in general,167 the due process and 
privacy arguments, on their own merit, are unlikely to justify his 
release.168  As attorney Joseph Landau indicated, “[The] Kansas court 
was able to ignore the clear intention of the Lawrence ruling because, 
whereas Lawrence was decided on privacy grounds, Limon involved 
equal protection.”169  Further, he noted: 
[T]he ACLU . . . did not assert the due process privacy right at 
the core of Lawrence, as doing so would have required challenging 
 
 163 See Tjagsa Practice Note: Criminal Law Notes: Instructors, The Judge Advocate General 
School, 1992 ARMY LAW. 33, 34 (discussing United States v. Alexander, 34 M.J. 121 
(C.M.A. 1992), where after the Court of Military Appeals granted review, the Court 
“ultimately declined to decide the case on that basis.”  Instead, “Chief Judge Sullivan 
and Senior Judge Everett found that the evidence was admissible as the product of a 
search supported by probable cause.  This result is unfortunate.  A decision on the 
granted issue would have provided practitioners with unequivocal guidance about 
MRE 313(b) and the ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard.”  Id. at 34.  The 
author adds, “Nevertheless, the Court of Military Appeals’ decision in Alexander is 
worth examining because Judge Cox did decide the granted issue in his concurring 
opinion.  Although this opinion is not binding precedent, it is remarkable in its 
approach.”).  See also Major Edward J. Kinberg, USALSA REPORT: Hindsight—
Litigation That Might Be Avoided, 1989 ARMY LAW. 26, 30 (“While Judge Riismandel’s 
concurring opinion may not be binding precedent, it certainly gives an idea of where 
the board may be heading in the future.”).  Further, Justice O’Connor’s concurring 
opinion carries little precedential effect, since she was the sixth justice to vote against 
the Texas statute, and her vote was not required in overruling Bowers. 
 164 “Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for 
conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important 
respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests.”  Lawrence, 539 
U.S. at 575. 
 165 Some commentators opine that the due process claim is broader than the 
equal protection, see infra note 304 and accompanying text. 
 166 Lawrence is helpful since it overruled Bowers, as well as giving Limon “a new 
avenue to appeal his 17-year sentence.”  Robert B. Bluey, Kansas Man Tests Supreme 
Court’s Sodomy Ruling (Oct. 27, 2003), at 
http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewCulture.asp?Page=\Culture\archive\200310\CUL20031
027a.html. 
 167 See supra text accompanying note 6. 
 168 See infra text accompanying note 177. 
 169 Landau, supra note 11. 
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the entire statutory rape law.  Instead, it sought only to challenge 
the law’s discriminatory application, arguing that the statute 
violated the boy’s rights to equal protection.  But this rationale 
handed Kansas an easy, if disingenuous, escape hatch.170 
This “escape hatch” is obvious in the Limon opinion, where the 
court pointed out, “Limon is not asserting a Lawrence−like due 
process challenge.  Instead, Limon makes an equal protection 
challenge . . . , [and] the law and facts are distinguishable from 
Lawrence.”171 
It is difficult to say what effect Lawrence may have on Limon’s 
case in the Kansas Supreme Court.  While the Court in Lawrence 
relied on “fundamental propositions and discussions,” it never 
declared that homosexual sodomy is a “fundamental right,” nor did it 
subject the Texas law to a strict scrutiny standard of review that would 
otherwise have been appropriate if sodomy was a fundamental 
right.172  Thus, categorizing Lawrence as a “landmark” decision173 may 
have been inappropriate.  Rather, as many analysts realize, “Lawrence 
is emerging as a far less revolutionary legal precedent than first 
advertised . . . .”174  Consequently, Lawrence may not support Limon’s 
equal protection case after all. 
Furthermore, while overruling Bowers, “the Court leaves 
strangely untouched its central legal conclusion,”175 specifically, what 
standard of scrutiny should apply to such laws.  The majority’s due 
process analysis in Lawrence, as well as Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence, does not actually address Limon’s equal protection 
argument.176  In fact, there are various differences between Lawrence 
 
 170 Id. 
 171 Kansas v. Limon, 83 P.3d at 234-35. 
 172 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 173 See Elmer, supra note 1. 
 174 Warren Richey, Gay Rights No Easy Sell in Courts; Despite High-Profile Victories, Gay-
Rights Activists Have Lost Most Recent Cases, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Feb. 9, 2004, 
available at http://lgrl.sitestreet.com/news/article.asp?id=1144. 
 175 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 176 Limon is challenging the Kansas statute based on equal protection.  See supra 
text accompanying notes 75-77.  In Lawrence, while the 
equal protection argument seems very simple at first . . . the Texas 
statute violates the equal protection clause because it criminalizes 
identical conduct when engaged in by same-sex couples but not when 
engaged in by opposite-sex couples.  But the argument is not so simple 
at all.  Gays are not a suspect class, and it was not at all clear that 
discrimination against gays would be subjected to heightened scrutiny 
under equal-protection analysis . . . the right to commit homosexual 
sodomy is not [a fundamental liberty interest].  If subjected to the 
lowest-level rational-relationship test, it is easy to imagine the High 
Court (or any court) conjuring excuses that anti-sodomy laws are 
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and Limon, which have led Kansas to argue that Lawrence is not 
controlling on Limon’s case.177  Lawrence involved two consenting 
adults,178 acting in private.179  Limon involved a minor180 under the age 
of legal consent,181 thus unable to consent,182 acting in a public 
facility.183  Such differences have already become a barrier to Limon, 
as the Court stressed several of these distinctions.184  Further, while 
many gay rights victories stemmed from the Lawrence decision,185 a 
backlash is predicted.186 
 
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. 
Elmer, supra note 1, at 6. 
 177 “[T]he present case is legally distinguishable from Lawrence . . . . [T]he 
Lawrence Court declared that private consensual homosexual acts between adults are 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause . . . . Limon makes an 
Equal Protection challenge . . . . As a result, the law and facts are distinguishable 
from Lawrence.”  Kansas v. Limon, 83 P.3d at 234-35. 
 178 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The case does involve two adults who, with full and 
mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a 
homosexual lifestyle.”). 
 179 Id.  (“The present case does not . . . involve public conduct . . . .”). 
 180 Brief for Petitioner at 3a, Limon (No. 00CR36). 
 181 M.A.R. was just short of fifteen years of age.  Brief for Petitioner at 30a, Limon 
(No. 00CR36).  Sixteen is the “age of consent” in Kansas.  United States v. Kelly, No. 
99-10100-01-WEB, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5293, at *8 (D. Kan. Mar. 2, 2000).  
 182 See infra text accompanying note 225. 
 183 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 184 See infra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 185  
The historic chain of events - equally stunning to conservative forces - 
began in June, when the Supreme Court overturned Texas’ anti-
sodomy law, in effect decriminalizing gay sex in the last 13 states where 
such laws were on the books.  Over the next few months, the Episcopal 
Church consecrated an openly gay bishop; Wal-Mart, the country’s 
largest private employer, extended its anti-discrimination policy to gays 
and lesbians; Bride’s magazine featured its first article on same-sex 
weddings; California lawmakers granted same-sex couples nearly all the 
rights of married spouses; and Massachusetts’ Supreme Judicial Court 
ruled gays had a constitutional right to marry. 
Associated Press, David Crary, Gains for Gay-Rights Movement, WOODLAND DAILY 
DEMOCRAT (Dec. 27, 2003), available at 
http://www.dailydemocrat.com/articles/2003/12/27/news/news9_.txt. 
 186 See id. 
Even while anticipating bitter struggles ahead, particularly over 
marriage, gay-rights activists interpreted the events as a sign that most 
of their goals would be achieved, and sooner rather than later.  Foes of 
gay rights, conversely, hoped the landmark court rulings would 
provoke a backlash that at minimum would thwart recognition of same-
sex marriages. 
Id; see also Laura Douglas-Brown, ‘Unprecedented’ Court Victories Mark 2003, Backlash 
Builds Support for Constitutional Ban of Gay Marriage, WASH. BLADE, Jan. 2, 2004, at 
http://www.washblade.com/2004/1-2/news/national/victories.cfm (“. . . [B]acklash 
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A. First Signs of Backlash 
Gay-rights activists hoped that the Lawrence v. Texas decision 
“would mark a turning point in the fight to end what they . . . [saw] as 
the second-class status of homosexuals in America.”187  However, only 
eight months after the infamous decision, one observer noted: 
“Lawrence is emerging as a far less revolutionary legal precedent than 
first advertised . . . . Lower courts have issued [several] rulings since 
Lawrence, but only one was a victory for gay rights.”188  Furthermore, 
that victory, Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health,189 which required 
recognition of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, was not even 
based on a newly recognized right post-Lawrence, but rather, on a 
broad reading of the state constitution.190  While the Massachusetts 
case is a great victory, in the broader scheme, “other judges who have 
been asked to apply—and expand upon—the Lawrence precedent 
have been anything but friendly to gay rights.”191  Rather, “in spite of 
the Massachusetts ruling, it is becoming increasingly clear to 
advocates and critics alike that Lawrence has not launched a straight-
line march toward expansion of gay rights through litigation.”192  
Recent lower court decisions that “limit or criticize Lawrence are 
beginning to suggest a more complicated path ahead for gay rights 
advocates, with detours and reversals likely—along with victories like 
the one in Massachusetts.”193 
Whereas Goodridge was viewed as the first post-Lawrence victory, 
Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services194 was 
seen as Lawrence’s first “setback.”195  In Lofton, the Eleventh Circuit 
 
to the sodomy decision began just days after the Supreme Court heard arguments in 
the case on March 26.”). 
 187 Richey, supra note 174. 
 188 Id. 
 189 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); see also Tony Mauro, Rocky Path for Gay Rights 
Cases Despite Lawrence; High Court Logic in Landmark Ruling Rejected by Kansas, Florida 
Courts, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 9, 2004, at 1 (“The first post-Lawrence decision that seemed 
to justify that optimism came last November when the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court ruled in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health that the state’s bar 
against same-sex marriage could not be constitutionally justified.  Lawrence was cited 
repeatedly in that decision.”). 
 190 Richey, supra note 174. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Mauro, supra note 189. 
 193 Id.  Further, in the post-Lawrence regime, there is even more of a conservative 
push in issuing an amendment to the Constitution limiting marriage to opposite sex.  
See Carl Hulse, Senate Hears Testimony on a Gay Marriage Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
4, 2004, at 26. 
 194 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 195 Mauro, supra note 189, at 1. 
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Court of Appeals upheld Florida’s ban on the adoption of foster care 
children by homosexuals.196  The plaintiffs challenged the Florida 
statute on two grounds: Lawrence’s right to privacy and Equal 
Protection.197  The Eleventh Circuit, however, unanimously rejected 
both claims, interpreting Lawrence narrowly and differentiating the 
case from Lawrence because Lofton involved minors.198  Further, the 
Eleventh Circuit criticized Lawrence in detail stating, “We are 
particularly hesitant to infer a new fundamental liberty interest from 
an opinion whose language and reasoning are inconsistent with 
standard fundamental-rights analysis.”199  Even further, the Eleventh 
Circuit charged that the “constitutional liberty interests on which the 
[Lawrence] Court relied were invoked, not with ‘careful description,’ 
but with sweeping generality.”200 
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit not only interpreted Lawrence 
narrowly,201 but also rejected the notion that Lawrence granted 
homosexuals a fundamental right.202  Further, the Eleventh Circuit 
held that Lawrence only required a rational basis standard of review,203 
reasoning that the case involved minors as the basis to distinguish it 
from Lawrence.204  Lastly, the Eleventh Circuit gave great deference to 
the legislature.205 
Two days following the Lofton decision “came another ruling that 
 
 196 358 F.3d 804. 
 197 Id. at 809. 
 198 Id. at 818. 
Moreover, the holding of Lawrence does not control the present case.  
Apart from the shared homosexuality component, there are marked 
differences in the facts of the two cases.  The Court itself stressed the 
limited factual situation it was addressing in Lawrence [Court cites 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 – “The present case does not involve 
minors.”].  Here, the involved actors are not only consenting adults, 
but minors as well . . . . Hence, we conclude that the Lawrence decision 
cannot be extrapolated to create a right to adopt for homosexual 
persons. 
Id. at 817; see also Mauro, supra note 189. 
 199 Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817; see also Mauro, supra note 189. 
 200 Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817. 
 201 The Lofton court interpreted Lawrence as simply holding that “substantive due 
process does not permit a state to impose a criminal prohibition on private 
consensual homosexual conduct.  The effect of this holding was to establish a greater 
respect than previously existed in the law for the right of consenting adults to engage 
in private sexual conduct.”  Id. at 815-16. 
 202 Id. at 816 (“Nowhere, however, did the Court characterize this right as 
‘fundamental.’”). 
 203 Id. at 817. 
 204 See infra note 210 and accompanying text. 
 205 Lofton, 358 F.3d at 827. 
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gave Lawrence a short shrift, this time from the Kansas Court of 
Appeals.”206  This decision was Kansas v. Limon.207  In this case, as in 
Lofton, the Kansas Court of Appeals interpreted Lawrence narrowly, 
echoing the distinction made in Lofton that the law applies differently 
to minors than it does to adults.208 
B. Limon: Adults vs. Minors 
In Lawrence, for the first time, the United States Supreme Court 
recognized a privacy right for homosexuals to engage in homosexual 
activities.209  The Court, however, stipulated that this privacy right only 
extends to “consenting adults.”210  Thus, one could make the 
argument that Lawrence grants a privacy right only to adults.211  This 
suggests an argument that Lawrence, by specifically excluding minors, 
has no impact whatsoever on Limon, a case dealing with underage 
sex.212  This movement, limiting Lawrence to situations involving 
adults, has already transpired in Lofton. 
Additionally, the Kansas Court of Appeals latest Limon decision 
relied on this distinction.  The Court of Appeals began its analysis by 
focusing on Justice Kennedy’s language in Lawrence: “The case does 
involve two adults, who with full and mutual consent from each 
other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual 
lifestyle.”213  Next, the Court of Appeals reasoned that Lawrence’s 
“major premise may be reconstructed to state: All adults may legally 
engage in private consensual sexual practices common to a 
 
 206 Mauro, supra note 189, at 1. 
 207 Kansas v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229. 
 208 Mauro, supra note 189. 
 209 See generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. 
 210 “The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each 
other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.”  Id. at 578 
(emphasis added). 
 211 “The present case does not involve minors.  It does not involve persons who 
might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent 
might not easily be refused . . . . The case does involve two adults . . . .”  Id. at 578 
(emphasis added). 
 212 As University of California at Los Angeles law professor Eugene Volokh 
opined, “[i]f states have flexibility in deciding what is permitted for adults, it seems 
to me that they would, as a constitutional matter, have even more flexibility in what is 
permitted with children.”  Homosexuals Ask Supreme Court to Strike Down Homo 
“Pedophile” Laws, THE WELCH REP., Oct. 14, 2002, at 
http://www.welchreport.com/pastnews_c.cfm?rank=523.  Therefore, because 
Limon’s case involves a minor, Limon may not receive the privacy protection that has 
been granted in Lawrence.  Specifically, the fact that the Court mentioned such a 
caveat shows that the Lawrence “victory” may not encompass Limon. 
 213 Kansas v. Limon, 83 P.3d at 234. 
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homosexual lifestyle.”214  Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded, 
“Children are excluded from the proposition.”215  Lastly, the Kansas 
court emphasized that “[b]ecause the present case involved a 14-year-
old . . . child, it is factually distinguishable from Lawrence.”216 
The Kansas Court of Appeals further justified Limon’s 
conviction, noting that the unequal position of children, both 
physically and mentally, “make them a proper subject for legislative 
protection.”217  The Court of Appeals emphasized that even laws 
operating in the “sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights” 
have been sustained when they were “aimed at protecting the physical 
and emotional well-being of youth.”218  Drawing from cases such as 
Prince v. Massachusetts219 where the United States Supreme Court held 
a statute prohibiting use of a child to distribute literature on the 
street was valid notwithstanding the statute’s effect on a First 
Amendment activity,220 the Court of Appeals concluded that 
“[p]rotective legislation is permissible even though based on a 
classification which may seem unreasonable.”221 
Using this rationale, the Kansas Court of Appeals added that 
through the legislature’s passing of the criminal sodomy statute and 
punishing homosexual teenage sex more severely than teenage 
heterosexual acts, it has acted reasonably as to prevent gradual 
deterioration of sexual morality, encourage and preserve traditional 
sexual mores of society, and not disturb traditional sexual 
developments of children.222  The Court of Appeals essentially 
interpreted Limon’s case in the same way it did before Lawrence.  In 
fact, the Court of Appeals construed Justice Kennedy’s language in 
Lawrence as a limitation, barring Limon’s release. 
 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. at 235. 
 218 Id. at 236. 
 219 310 U.S. 158 (1944). 
 220 Kansas v. Limon, 83 P.3d at 236.  See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-
57 (1982) (“It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State’s interest in 
‘safeguarding the physical and physiological well-being of a minor’ is ‘compelling.’”) 
(citations omitted); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (sustaining a New 
York law protecting children from exposure to non-obscene literature). 
 221 Kansas v. Limon, 83 P.3d at 236. 
 222 Id.  Further, the Court disapproved of Limon’s Brief, which marked M.A.R. as 
a homosexual or bisexual.  The Court asserted that this label is “unfair” because the 
record reveals that he had only one same-sex encounter with Limon.  The Court 
added, “[I]f M.A.R.’s sexual identity was not well defined before his homosexual 
encounter with Limon, M.A.R. might have become confused about his sexual 
identify.”  Id. at 266-67. 
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C. Limon; consent 
Likewise, by limiting this privacy right to adults, the Supreme 
Court in Lawrence essentially requires consent.  While consent is 
presumed when the actors are adults, in cases involving children, 
consent is not presumed.223  Further, the Supreme Court notes that 
the Bowers Court employed flawed reasoning because early sodomy 
laws were not enforced against consenting adults acting in private, 
but “[i]nstead, sodomy prosecutions often involved predatory acts 
against those who could not or did not consent [such as]: relations 
between men and minor girls, [and] between adults involving 
force . . . .”224  By distinguishing between different levels of consent, 
the Supreme Court is essentially awarding preferential treatment to 
consensual relationships.  This distinction is crucial to Limon’s case, 
since M.A.R., who was under the age of sixteen, could not legally have 
formed the requisite consent.225 
However, while there are different considerations as to consent, 
the same basic issue underlies both cases: Kansas and Texas punish 
the same sexual act differently based solely on the sexual orientation 
of the participants.226  In both Limon and Lawrence, the defendants 
sought equal punishments for equal crimes.227  In Lawrence, this was 
achieved through the privacy protection of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.228  Limon argued an Equal Protection violation.229  
Nevertheless, both cases essentially pose the same issue, leading to 
 
 223 See infra Part V.B discussing consent. 
 224 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 561. 
 225 “[A] minor [is] therefore incapable of consent.”  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 569.  See 
also discussion of consent infra Part V. 
 226 Limon’s attorney, Tamara Lange of the ACLU, pronounced, “[T]he case 
presents the same equal protection question that was central to the Lawrence 
decision.”  Bluey, supra note 166.  Ms. Lange stated further, “The Supreme Court 
made it very clear that you can no longer punish someone differently for being 
gay . . . . Yet Matthew Limon continues to sit in jail because when he was a teenager 
he had consensual sex with another male rather than a female.”  Appeal Begins for 
Teen Sentenced to Prison for Gay Sex, supra note 36. 
 227 Lange [Limon’s attorney] said the issue comes down to fairness, 
something the Kansas law did not afford to Limon.  She said it would 
be outlandish for a judge to sentence a homosexual teenager to a 
stiffer sentence than a heterosexual teenager if each robbed the same 
convenience store.  If that is the case . . . there is no reason to impose a 
tougher sentence on Limon for having had sex.  “It’s really about 
having equal punishment for equal crimes . . . . If you perform the 
same acts, you should have the same penalty.” 
Robert B. Bluey, Homosexuals Ask Supreme Court to Strike Down ‘Anti-Gay’ Laws (Oct. 14, 
2002) at http://www.cnsnews.com/Culture/Archive/200210/CUL20021014a.html. 
 228 See generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. 
 229 Brief for Petitioner at 7-8, Limon (No. 00CR36). 
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the inquiry of whether the Lawrence decision directs Limon’s release. 
While in both cases the defendants filed a petition for certiorari 
to the United States Supreme Court,230 the Court granted a writ in 
Lawrence only.231  The essential holding of Lawrence is that consenting 
adults have a privacy right to engage in homosexual acts.232  On first 
appearance, this does not encompass Limon, where one of the 
participants was a minor and thus could not consent.233  However, the 
Court clearly recognized the possible effect of Lawrence on Limon by 
remanding the Limon case to the Kansas Court of Appeals just one 
day after deciding Lawrence.234  In fact, the Supreme Court met for this 
particular purpose.235  This was seen by some as “the first ripple effect” 
of Lawrence.236 
The Court’s action poses one question—why?  If Lawrence, as the 
Court stated on several occasions, does not extend a privacy right to 
minors, why give Limon a second chance?  One opinion is that the 
Court “clearly felt . . . that a great deal of injustice has been done to 
Matthew Limon . . . . [L]aws that punish lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
people far more harshly than heterosexuals for the same thing are 
simply discriminatory and wrong . . . .”237  Another possibility is that 
the United States Supreme Court merely sent the case back because 
the Kansas district court based its reasoning in Limon on the Bowers 
decision, which had just been overruled.238  Lastly, perhaps the Court 
 
 230 Id. at 23; Lawrence v. Texas, 537 U.S. 1044 (2002). 
 231 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. 
 232 See generally id. 
 233 “‘The Supreme Court’s decision had to do with consenting adults,’ [said 
Miami County Attorney David Miller].  ‘The victim in this case was not of age to give 
consent.’”  Tom Rizzo, U.S. Supreme Court Remands Kansas Case Involving Underage, Gay 
Sex, KAN. CITY STAR, June 28, 2003, at 1. 
 234 539 U.S. 955 (2003). 
 235 “The Supreme Court came in for a special session to order this review the day 
after the Texas (and Kansas) sodomy laws were deemed unconstitutional . . . .”  
Richard Heckler, Kline’s Tantrum, TOPEKA CAP. –J. (Kan.), Sept. 18, 2003, at 4, 
available at 2003 WL 62492681.  “The order was made in light of Thursday’s ruling 
that struck down Texas’ same-sex sodomy law, the Supreme Court announced.  It was 
the only such order issued Friday, according to a court spokesman.”  Rizzo, supra 
note 233. 
 236 “The Supreme Court announced yesterday the first ripple effect of its 
landmark decision on gay rights, ordering a Kansas court to reconsider its approval 
of a 17-year sentence . . . .”  Lane, supra note 89. 
 237 Dick Kurtenbach, Executive Director of the ACLU of Kansas and Western 
Missouri, opined this comment, see Court Asked to Overturn 17-Year Prison Sentence of Bi 
Teen (Aug. 11, 2003), at 
http://www.365gay.com/NewsContent/081103romeoLaw.htm. 
 238 “‘The Kansas court justified Matthew’s conviction on the basis that the 
Supreme Court had upheld anti-gay sodomy laws in its 1986 Bowers v. Hardwick 
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acknowledged the significance and possible implications of Justice 
O’Connor’s Equal Protection concurrence. 
Whatever its reasoning, the United States Supreme Court has 
given Matthew Limon, who has already served over three years of his 
seventeen-year sentence, “hope” for a release.239  It remains to be seen 
if Limon has more than a hope in the aftermath of Lawrence, as 
Lawrence, after all, left many questions unanswered. 
V. POST-LAWRENCE—REMAINING QUESTIONS 
Decisions following Lawrence, including Lofton and the Kansas 
Court of Appeals decision on remand in Limon, reflect that although 
the Lawrence case may have been a “breakthrough,” it is currently on 
“shak[y] ground[s].”240  The language of the Lawrence decision itself is 
partially to blame.241  David Garrow, a legal historian at Emory 
University observes, “What judges seem to be saying is that Justice 
Kennedy may be too rhetorically poetic for his own good . . . . [I]t 
may sound winsome as moral commentary, but as blackletter 
constitutional law, [judges] are not impressed.”242  Furthermore, 
other than its “poetic” language, the opinion has other ambiguities, 
leaving several unanswered questions, specifically in Limon’s case. 
A. Minors 
The Lawrence decision left various questions open.  Some 
advocate that the Supreme Court, by expressly stating that the privacy 
right should be offered to adults, ensured that Limon, a case involving 
teenagers, would not be affected.243  In addition, proponents of the 
Romeo and Juliet law argue that it is a legitimate law to protect 
children; thus, the Kansas law has no relation to the law struck down 
 
ruling,’ said Tamara Lange, Limon’s attorney from the ACLU’s Lesbian and Gay 
Rights Project.  ‘Now that Bowers has been overturned, the Kansas Court of Appeals 
should recognize that this young man should not spend more time in prison just 
because he’s bisexual.’”  Id. 
 239 Limon’s attorney, Tamara Lange of the ACLU, said: “[T]he fact that the 
Supreme Court remanded the case for further consideration should give Limon 
hope he will be released . . . .”  Bluey, supra note 166. 
 240 Mauro, supra note 189. 
 241 Id. (“[T]he criticism already leveled at Lawrence has some analysts wondering 
whether the structure and language of Kennedy’s majority opinion invited attack.”). 
 242 Id. 
 243 See Bluey, supra note 166.  “Kansas Attorney General Phill Kline has defended 
Limon’s prosecution.  He has the support of 25 state lawmakers who filed a friend-of-
the-court brief arguing that the Lawrence decision has nothing to do with pedophilia 
or any other laws regulating sex between adults and minors.”  Id. 
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in Lawrence.244  If that is the case, it seems paradoxical for the United 
States Supreme Court to give Limon another chance.245  A contrary 
opinion is that the Court, after overruling Bowers, simply remanded 
the case not to grant Limon a second chance, but to allow the 
appellate court to apply consistent precedent.246  Thus, the weight 
given to this particular point is unsettled. 
A main argument for upholding Limon’s conviction is that he 
engaged in this conduct with a minor.247  Throughout the majority 
and concurring opinions, the Supreme Court carefully noted that 
Lawrence did not extend to minors.248  A literal reading would imply 
that Limon’s actions with M.A.R., a minor, are not protected, since 
different standards apply when dealing with the conduct of minors.249  
 
 244 See infra note 247 discussing differentiations between adults and minors. 
 245 The United States Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari to the Court 
of Appeals of Kansas “for further consideration . . . .”  Limon v. Kansas, 539 U.S. 955 
(2003).  See also Greenhouse, supra note 14.  “In an immediate application of its 
newly protective approach to gay rights, the Supreme Court today vacated the 
sodomy conviction of a Kansas teenager.”  Further, “in a one-sentence order, the 
justices told the Kansas Court of Appeals to reconsider the conviction and sentence 
in light of the Supreme Court ruling on Thursday that overturned a Texas sodomy 
law.”  Id. 
 246 See supra Part IV.C. 
 247 During oral arguments on December 3, 2003, Deputy Attorney General Jared 
Maag argued “that the Legislature has the authority to determine the punishment 
for minors who engage in sexual acts in order to teach moral values to children, 
including ‘traditional family roles.’”  Chris Grenz, Court Takes on Gay Teen Sex Case, 
TOPEKA CAP. –J. (Kan.), Dec. 3, 2003, at 8, available at 2003 WL 62495800.  Kansas 
Attorney General, Phill Kline shares this viewpoint: 
Kline said . . . that the American Civil Liberties Union is arguing that 
teenagers have a constitutional right to have sexual relations with 
anyone they want.  [This] “is absolutely a remarkable assault on the 
authority of the family because when your daughter walks out the door 
and says, ‘I’m going to meet my 40-year-old boyfriend’ and you try to 
guide her and parent her, and say, ‘No, that’s not going to happen’ 
and she holds up an ACLU card and says, ‘Call my attorney,’ we are 
living in a different type of America.” 
Grenz, supra note 50.  Kline further stated that “if the state loses a sodomy case 
currently before a state appeals court [i.e., Limon], Kansas marriage laws and laws 
against sex with children will be nullified.”  Associated Press, John Hanna, KANSAS: 
Kline Says Marriage, Consent Laws in Danger; ACLU Disputes Claim (Sept. 16, 2003), 
available at http://lgrl.sitestreet.com/news/print.asp?id=458. 
 248 Lawrence specifically stated, “This case does not involve minors, persons who 
might be injured or coerced . . . . It does involve two adults who, with full and mutual 
consent, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.”  Lawrence, 
539 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added). 
 249 See supra note 212 and accompanying text.  Further, just as states can justify 
laws such as refusing to furnish alcohol to children but not adults, “lawmakers could 
have several reasons for setting up different sodomy penalties.”  Associated Press, 
John Hanna, Kan. Court Backs Harsher Sodomy Sentence (Jan. 30, 2004), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A63810-2004Jan30.html. 
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A more careful inquiry, however, may suggest that this literal 
interpretation is not unquestionably what the Supreme Court 
intended. 
Courts generally recognize that minors enjoy fewer sexual rights 
than adults.250  When the Lawrence Court stated the decision does not 
extend to minors, it may simply have affirmed this general principle.  
The Court reiterated that there is a privacy right to engage in 
homosexual relationships in the home and that “the State cannot 
demean their [homosexuals’] existence or control their destiny by 
making their private sexual conduct a crime.”251  Yet, this does not 
mean that this protection must exclude teenagers.252  While teenagers 
may have no more privacy rights after Lawrence than before, the 
Lawrence decision does not necessarily serve to limit minors’ rights. 
Therefore, a state can still monitor and set up rules regulating 
relationships between minors; however, homosexual minors may still 
enjoy the benefits derived from this ruling.  Prior to Lawrence, 
homosexual activity was illicit and illegal.  After Lawrence, homosexual 
activity is neither and thus should not warrant stricter punishment.  
Under this reading of Lawrence, Kansas can punish Limon for 
engaging in consensual sexual behavior with a child under the Kansas 
criminal sodomy statute,253 but may not punish him for longer than a 
heterosexual teenager.254  This, in essence, is the heart of Justice 
O’Connor’s Equal Protection argument. 
Thus, although Lawrence specifically addresses adults and seems 
to exclude minors from the general decision,255 it is likely to support 
Limon’s case, at least minimally.  Although it is recognized that in 
 
 250 For the notion that minors do not enjoy a constitutional sexual privacy right is 
quite common, see In re T.A.J., 62 Cal. App. 4th 1350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).  “Minors 
have no privacy right to engage in consensual sexual intercourse . . . . [D]ue to age 
and immaturity, minors often lack the ability to make fully informed choices that 
take account of both immediate and long-range consequences.”  Id. at 1361. 
 251 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 252 See supra note 250 and accompanying text. 
 253 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (2002). 
 254 See Appeal Begins for Teen Sentenced to Prison for Gay Sex, supra note 36.  Dick 
Kurtenbach, Executive Director of the ACLU of Kansas and Western Missouri stated: 
Contrary to Attorney General Phill Kline’s many efforts to confuse the 
real issues behind this case, we’re not saying the state shouldn’t protect 
teens or punish those who break the law.  We are only asking that the 
state treat gay teens the same as it does straight teens . . . . Matthew 
Limon isn’t asking for a get out of jail free card – he’s saying he should 
have been convicted and punished . . . [and received the same 
protection under]– the Romeo and Juliet law. 
Id. 
 255 See note 210 supra and accompanying text. 
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general, minors have less privacy rights than adults, this does not 
mean that the benefits homosexuals will receive from Lawrence 
cannot extend to minors.  While minors continue to possess less 
sexual and privacy rights than adults, it does not necessarily follow 
that only homosexual adults are free to engage in homosexual 
conduct.  Even though the Court stated that the decision does not 
include minors, it did not say that the decision cannot include minors.  
It is difficult to predict, however, how far courts will—and should—
extend these benefits.  Nevertheless, it can be conceded that Limon’s 
prospects seem greater post-Lawrence than in the Bowers regime. 
B.  Age of Consent 
The next potential hurdle, also relating to the age of the 
participants, is consent.  The Court assumed consent was present in 
Lawrence,256 however, in Limon, consent poses a problem.  M.A.R., the 
“victim,” was fifteen years of age.  The age of consent in Kansas is 
sixteen.257  M.A.R. was under the age of consent,258 meaning that 
although the acts were consensual,259 M.A.R. could not have 
effectively, or legally, “consented” to them.260 
Consent began as a legislative determination that established at 
what age a female was capable of consenting to engage in sexual 
acts.261  Lawmakers enacted early statutory rape laws and age of 
consent laws “to protect young females’ virginity in order to ensure 
their eligibility for marriage.”262  In the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, “reformers and families used statutory rape laws 
both to protect and to control the sexuality of working class girls 
 
 256 See note 232 supra and accompanying text. 
 257 See note 16 supra and accompanying text. 
 258 See note 15 supra and accompanying text. 
 259 See note 13 supra and accompanying text. 
 260 “Under the old statute and similar ones in other states, it has always been held 
that the female child below the age prescribed is utterly without capacity to consent.”  
State v. Frazier, 54 Kan. 719 (1895).  Therefore, “there can be no such thing as 
fornication with a female child under the age of consent . . . . If she cannot consent, 
then any person lewdly touching her commits an assault, and an assault is always an 
unlawful act.”  Id. 
 261 See DONALD E.J. MACNAMARA & EDWARD SAGARIN, SEX, CRIME, AND THE LAW 67 
(Free Press 1977)  (“‘Statutory rape’ usually refers to . . . a consensual act in that 
both parties agreed but one legally regarded as a form of rape because the age and 
presumed immaturity of the female did not give her the legal right to offer 
consent.”). 
 262 Britton Guerrina, Comment: Mitigating Punishment for Statutory Rape, 65 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1251, 1259 (1998).  See also Michael M. v. Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 472 n.7 
(1981). 
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laboring in the new urban centers.”263  The necessity for these laws, 
however, is still present in modern times.  Two policy goals explain 
why legislatures retain a statutory age of consent: “(1) to prevent 
teenage girls from consenting to sex in an uninformed manner, 
thereby exposing themselves to physical and emotional harm; and (2) 
to deter men from preying on young females and coercing them into 
sexual relationships.”264  Both of these goals seek to deter risks from 
sexual relationships, such as pregnancy, disease, and emotional 
harm.265  To prevent such harms, age of consent laws serve as a 
deterrent to older men from taking advantage of younger females.266 
Historically age of consent laws existed primarily to protect 
young females.  Prior to Lawrence, Kansas’s age of consent laws did 
not explicitly encompass homosexuals.267  Because homosexual 
sodomy was illegal, neither adults nor teenagers could legally consent 
to it.  In the post-Lawrence regime, however, because sodomy is 
effectively legal, the possibility exists that states can continue to 
prevent homosexual conduct, at least for teenagers, through indirect 
regulation, accomplished by enacting a higher age of consent.268  
Though sodomy is legal, by enacting a very high age of consent (i.e., 
twenty-one, as England and Australia have done), a state can 
effectively preclude sodomy in a great part of its population.  This 
type of regulation, in operation, goes beyond simply “protecting 
 
 263 Guerrina, supra note 262, at 1259. 
 264 Id. at 1259-60. 
 265 Id. at 1260. 
 266 See supra note 260 and accompanying text. 
 267 See chart of age of consent laws in the United States, at 
http://www.ageofconsent.com/ageofconsent.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2004). 
 268 As early as 1967, Europe, arguably more progressive than the United States in 
terms of gay-rights (as cited in Lawrence, see note 148 supra and note 274 infra), 
passed the Sexual Offences Act, making prohibitions on homosexual behavior 
unenforceable.  This Act applied only in England and Wales; Scotland joined in 1980 
and Northern Ireland in 1982.  At the time, the age of majority was eighteen; the age 
of consent for heterosexuals was sixteen; the age of consent, however, for 
homosexuals was twenty-one.  For the first time since the Act of 1967, the issue of 
consent was debated in 1994, when several nations lowered the age to eighteen.  In 
England, this issue is still being debated.  See Arabella Thorp, ‘Age of Consent’ for Male 
Homosexual Acts, Research Paper 98/68, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, HOME AFFAIRS 
SECTION, June 19, 1998, at 9, at http://www.parliament.uk/commons/ 
lib/research/rp98/rp98-068.pdf [hereinafter Research Paper].  The Research Paper 
was prepared in response to Ann Keen’s proposed amendments to the Crime and 
Disorder Bill [HL] [Bill 167 of 1997-98], which sought to lower the age of consent for 
male homosexual acts from 18 to 16.  This Research Paper discusses the amendments 
to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, which lowered the age of consent 
from 21 to 18, and examines the events leading up to the changes proposed 
currently.  In addition, it also provides an overview of some of the issues that may 
arise in considering lowering age of consent laws. 
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children.”269  By enacting a higher age of consent, a state aims to 
prevent an activity it believes to be morally reprehensible.  Such state 
actions bear greater resemblance to the “embarrassing” era of Bowers 
than to the current progressive Lawrence regime.  Thus, Limon is 
important, not only because it serves as a “test case” to see how far 
Lawrence will extend,270 but also because it can serve as a preventative 
measure against a backlash that could essentially outlaw homosexual 
activities of young adults through the enactment of higher age of 
consent laws.271  Further, this decision’s importance will be more than 
experimental.  In fact, “[a]dvocates and opponents of same-sex 
sodomy laws agree on one thing: The [C]ourt’s ruling on the issue 
could be a milestone in how sexual orientation and traditional views 
of marriage and family are treated under the law.”272  The Limon 
decision could fill in the holes of Lawrence, addressing whether sexual 
orientation deserves heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.273 
1. The European Model 
A similar issue regarding homosexual consent laws has recently 
been debated in Europe.274  While sodomy has been legal in Europe 
 
 269 See Kansas v. Limon, 83 P.3d at 235-37. 
 270 See supra note 89. 
 271 This possibility has been made apparent: in oral arguments to the Kansas 
Court of Appeals on December 3, 2003, the Deputy attorney general argued that the 
“[Legislature] has the right to set polices regarding teen sex – even if lawmakers treat 
gays differently from heterosexuals.”  Grenz, supra note 247.  The Legislature has 
“the authority to determine the punishment for minors who engage in sexual acts in 
order to teach moral values to children, including ‘traditional family roles.’ . . . 
[T]he different penalties for same-sex teenage couples would promote marriage, 
encourage procreation and discourage the spread of disease.”  Id. 
 272 Geraldine Sealey, Imprisoned Teen Challenges Kansas ‘Romeo and Juliet’ Law, ABC 
NEWS, Jan. 17, 2003, at 
http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/teensodomy030117.html. 
 273 “The Supreme Court has not reached the question of whether sexual 
orientation warrants strict or intermediate scrutiny.  Some have argued it serves 
heightened scrutiny,’ said Ed Stein, a professor of sexual orientation, gender and the 
law at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law in New York.”  Id.  See also Section C infra 
discussing Romer. 
 274 While cases arising in and decided by European courts bear little precedential 
value, European decisions may still carry some weight.  The Court in Lawrence 
engaged in a discussion over how Europe has treated homosexuals: 
[A]lmost five years before Bowers was decided, the European Court of 
Human Rights considered a case with parallels to Bowers and to today’s 
case.  An adult male resident in Northern Ireland alleged he was a 
practicing homosexual who desired to engage in consensual 
homosexual conduct.  The laws of Northern Ireland forbade him that 
right . . . . The court held [in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom] that the laws 
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since 1967,275 some nations only recently lowered the age of consent 
for homosexuals to the same age as for heterosexuals.276  European 
 
proscribing the conduct were invalid under the European Convention 
on Human rights.  Authoritative in all countries that are members of 
the Council of Europe (21 nations then, 45 nations now), the decision 
is at odds with the premise in Bowers that the claim put forward was 
insubstantial in our Western civilization. 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (internal citations omitted). 
 275 Id. at 569-71. 
 276 Hungary: Paragraph 199 of the Hungarian Penal Code sets an age of consent of 
eighteen for sexual relations between persons of the same sex, and 14 for those 
between persons of the opposite sex.  ILGA-Europe Welcomes Hungarian Constitutional 
Court Age of Consent Ruling, Sept. 5, 2002, at http://www.ilga-
europe.org/m7/media_releases/2002-09-05-HUConsent.htm.  It was repealed on 
September 5, 2002.  Id.  The Code received challenges beginning in September 1993, 
when three organizations (Lambda Budapest Gay Society, Homeros Society, and the 
Hungarian Jewish Lesbian and Gay Group) addressed a petition to the 
Constitutional Court challenging the constitutionality of the law.  Id.  Challenges 
continued in 1996 and in 1998, and three cases since 1998.  However the 
Constitutional Court repeatedly postponed reaching a decision.  Id. 
In 2000 the issue was taken up at European level, when the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe passed a 
Recommendation calling inter alia for the repeal of remaining 
discriminatory age of consent laws in Europe, and citing Hungary 
amongst the countries which still maintained such laws.  The 
Hungarian Court’s ruling follows the repeal of laws discriminating on 
the basis of sexual orientation in Lithuania (2000 - although the new 
law has still to come into force), Estonia (2001), and Romania (2001). 
Id. 
Romania: 
Until 14 November 1996 same-sex relationships in Romania were 
illegal under Article 200 of the penal code.  On that date Article 200 
was amended so that the complete ban was lifted, but replaced with 
provisions that were almost as oppressive and discriminatory.  
Subsequent efforts by the Romanian government to ameliorate Article 
200 were frustrated by the Romanian Parliament.  On June 22nd 2001 
the Romanian government issued an ordinance abrogating Article 200.  
While this ordinance had the immediate effect of suspending the use 
of Article 200 in the courts, it remained subject to the approval of the 
Romanian Parliament and President.  This has finally now taken place, 
with the adoption of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 89/ 21 
June 2001 by the Chamber of Deputies on December 18, 2001, and by 
the Senate on December 20, 2001, and the approval of the President of 
Romania on January 14, 2002.  Article 200 included a number of 
measures, including a discriminatory age of consent, a discriminatory 
definition of what constitutes a public place, provisions relating to 
same-sex acts causing “public scandal”, and provisions limiting the 
rights of freedom association and expression of lesbians, gays and 
bisexuals.  The discriminatory age of consent law in Romania was 
repealed on February 4, 2002. 
Repeal of Laws Criminalizing Same-Sex Relationships in Romania Steps up Pressure for Repeal 
of Discriminatory Laws in Cyprus, Hungary and Bulgaria, Feb. 4, 2002, at 
http://www.ilga-europe.org/m7/media_releases/2002-02-04-RomaniaRepeal.html. 
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nations offered several justifications for the different age of consent 
for homosexuals.277  First, nations were concerned with the need to 
protect boys and young men.278  This concern arose out of sentiment 
that a higher age of consent is justified, since many young men have 
not yet achieved a settled sexual orientation.279  Second, some 
lawmakers felt that a function of criminal law is to protect young men 
from contracting diseases as a result of homosexuality.280 
Advocates of lowering the age of consent, however, made several 
counterarguments.  First, the current age (eighteen) did not 
effectively stop young gay men from engaging in sexual activity.281  
Second, the European nations did not provide any evidence that 
proved that the higher age of consent actually results in reducing 
homosexual orientation.282  Third, because homosexual teenage sex is 
criminalized, it “encourages a life of secrecy and deception for young 
gay people . . . [which] makes them vulnerable to blackmail.”283  
Fourth, because sexual activity is illegal, the law discourages young 
 
Cyprus: In July 12, 2002, after much pressure, Cyprus introduced an equal age of 
consent for homosexuals and heterosexuals: 
In order to remain on course for accession the Cyprus government 
reluctantly compromised to raise the age of consent between 
heterosexuals from 16 to 17 and to lower the age of consent between 
homosexuals from 18 to 17.  Eliminating the discriminatory age of 
consent law is a major achievement.  It is however “sad that the changes 
are brought about in response of EU pressure rather that being 
motivated because homosexuals’ rights are human rights” says ILGA-
Europe member, Alecos Modinos, Gay Liberation Movement of 
Cyprus. 
Cyprus Harmonises Age of Consent, July 12, 2002, at http://www.ilga-
europe.org/m7/media_releases/2002-07-12-CYConsent.htm. 
While Europe pressures new nations to grant homosexuals full equality, “[t]hese 
developments highlight yet again the shameful double standards operated by those 
EU member states, Austria, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and the UK, which still 
maintain discriminatory laws.”  Kurt Krickler, Romania Repeals Anti-Gay Law, Feb. 
2002, at http://www.ilga-europe.org/docs/newsletters/2002-1/Romania.htm. 
Lastly, Australia also recently saw such a victory.  In New South Wales, the age of 
homosexual sex was lowered to 16 (from the prior age of 21), on May 29, 2003.  
Australian State Lowers Age of Consent for Homosexual Sex, May 29, 2003, at 
http://www.lifesite.net/ldn/2003/may/03052910.html. 
 277 Note the similarities between the old European “justifications” and the ones in 
the Limon opinion.  Kansas v. Limon, 83 P.3d at 235-38 (justifying higher age of 
consent 1. to protect children; 2. because a minor may not yet have settled into a 
sexual orientation; and 3. for the prevention of disease). 
 278 See Research Paper, supra note 268. 
 279 Id. 
 280 Id. at 10. 
 281 Id. at 14 (citing Why Introduce an Equal Age of Consent? Outright Scotland, 1994). 
 282 Id. 
 283 Id. 
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gay men “from seeking advice about sexually transmitted diseases.”284  
Finally, because of the psychological impact of such laws, “[o]ne in 
five young gay men has attempted suicide at some time.”285  Tony 
Blair, current Prime Minister of England, who at the time of the 
debate held the position of Shadow Home Secretary, added: 
[The issue] is not at what age we wish young people to have sex.  
It is whether the criminal law should discriminate between 
heterosexual and homosexual sex.  It is therefore not an issue of 
age, but of equality.  By supporting equality, no one is advocating 
or urging gay sex at 16 any more that those who would maintain 
the age of consent for heterosexual sex advocate that girls or boys 
of 16 should have sex.  It is simply a question of whether there are 
grounds for discrimination.  At present, the law discriminates.286 
2. Indirect Regulation in the United States 
In the United States, where homosexuality and sodomy only 
recently began to receive federal constitutional protection through 
Lawrence, there exists a possibility that backlash will result in states 
enacting stricter laws to deter this conduct.  Even though states can 
no longer prevent adults from engaging in homosexual sodomy, 
states may attempt to continue to prevent it among teenagers and 
young adults, as Europe has done though higher age of consent laws.  
One could argue that the Romeo and Juliet law discriminates in the 
same fashion as the enactment of different ages of consent.  
Although the Romeo and Juliet law does not specifically provide a 
higher age of consent for homosexuals, it has a similar discriminatory 
effect because it reduces the penalty only if the actors are 
heterosexuals.  Both methods serve as means of indirect regulation of 
homosexual activities.  Limon does not argue that statutory rape 
should go unpunished, or that states should do away with the age of 
consent;287 Limon simply advocates that there should not be different 
standards and penalties if the actors are homosexuals rather than 
heterosexuals. 
Limon should prevail on this point for several reasons.  First, if 
 
 284 Research Paper, supra note 268, at 14. 
 285 Id. 
 286 Id.  Blair further stated: 
[P]eople are entitled to think that homosexuality is wrong, but they are 
not entitled to use criminal law to force that view upon others . . . . 
That is, also, why the so-called compromise of 18 is misguided.  What is 
the rationale behind maintaining the stigma but a different age? . . . 
[I]t is wrong to treat a man as inferior because his sexuality is different. 
Id. 
 287 See supra Part II. 
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courts allow a different penalty for homosexual conduct, they would 
prevent some of the benefits homosexuals hoped to achieve from 
their victory in Lawrence, since, once again, they would be subject to 
discrimination.288  Even more vital, through upholding the Romeo 
and Juliet law, sodomy and homosexuality will still be illegal for a 
substantial part of the population.  Further, by providing a harsher 
penalty for homosexuality, courts will be implying that homosexual 
behavior is illegitimate and illicit.289  This implication would be 
contrary to the new progressive vision of Lawrence.290  In essence, 
Limon could serve as a pretextual means to counteract Lawrence. 
Additionally, the purpose of the Romeo and Juliet law is to 
punish certain relationships, however, not at the expense of teenage 
experimentation.291  A refusal to extend the Romeo and Juliet law to 
homosexuals deters homosexual teenagers from sexual exploration 
more than it deters heterosexual teenagers.  If the purpose of 
consent laws is to punish abuse by older men seeking to take 
advantage of younger, more vulnerable (mainly female) actors, this 
purpose can still be accomplished even if states interpret the Romeo 
and Juliet law to apply to all people equally, even homosexuals.  
Further, while age of consent laws serve to protect the vulnerable, 
Kansas does not put forth any evidence that homosexual teenagers 
are any more vulnerable than heterosexual females.292  Therefore, 
Kansas is discriminating against homosexuals simply because it does 
not approve of their conduct, which the post-Lawrence regime does 
not allow. 
Interestingly, unlike European nations that justified such laws as 
protecting vulnerable young men,293 Kansas justifies upholding 
Limon’s punishment, and the Romeo and Juliet law, by maintaining 
that if forced to undo the law, the change would promote other 
 
 288 As recognized in Lawrence, discrimination against homosexuals in law leads to 
discrimination elsewhere.  See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (“When homosexual conduct 
is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an 
invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in 
the private spheres.”). 
 289 See supra text accompanying notes 281-285. 
 290 “The movement of this issue is all in one direction: toward greater acceptance, 
and legal protection, for gays.”  Fred Michmershuizen, Equal Rights for Gays, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002, at 28. 
 291 See supra text accompanying note 20. 
 292 One argument for having a higher age of consent for homosexual males is that 
males mature later, about two years later than females, thus, there is some 
justification that the average sixteen-year-old male is more confused than the average 
sixteen-year-old female.  Research Paper, supra note 268, at 38. 
 293 See supra text accompanying notes 278-280. 
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crimes such as bestiality, child abuse, and pedophilia.294  Some even 
link pedophiles with the movement to lower the age of consent.295  
Further, to a lesser extent, Justice Scalia’s dissent points to similar 
arguments where he fears the “homosexual agenda.”296  There is little 
rationale, however, for these fears.  Limon is not seeking to lower the 
age of consent in general;297 he is simply seeking the same 
punishment as he would have received had he been a heterosexual.  
 
 294 See Judith A. Reisman, Crafting Bi/Homosexual Youth, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 283, 
318-20 (2001/2002) (discussing a “homosexual political manifesto” and “homosexual 
campaign to recruit children.” . . . The author cautions: “The homosexual movement 
has long advocated ending age of consent laws” and that “as a result of such cult 
proselytizing in schools and nationwide, many homosexual groups are now ‘chock-a-
block full of young people.’  ‘Adult advisors’ also answer . . . the next phase, ‘to 
attract young people to the gay movement in large number.’  Child ‘initiates’ (many 
who die early of AIDS) are courted, given a pseudo-home and family, welcomed, 
wooed, held and embraced.”).  The author further cautions against this “homosexual 
agenda,” quoting Harris Mirkin, an associate professor of political science at the 
University of Missouri-Kansas City: “With more research, some scholars say, it may be 
only a matter of time before modern society accepts adult-child sex, just as it had 
learned to accept premarital sex and homosexual sex.  Children are the last bastion 
of the old sexual morality.”  Id. at 326. 
 295 See Steve Baldwin, Child Molestation and the Homosexual Movement, 14 REGENT U. 
L. REV. 267, 268 (2001/2002) (“Research confirms that homosexuals molest children 
at a rate vastly higher than heterosexuals, and the mainstream homosexual culture 
commonly promotes sex with children.”).  Id.  Further, “[h]omosexual leaders 
repeatedly argue for the freedom to engage in consensual sex with children, and 
blind surveys reveal a shockingly high number of homosexuals admit to sexual 
conduct with minors.”  Id.  In addition, “the homosexual community is driving the 
worldwide campaign to lower the legal age of consent.”  Id.  Lastly, the author 
suggests, “[t]he Holy Grail of the pedophile movement is the lowering or elimination 
of all age of consent laws.”  Id. at 277.  The author, a judge, also considers 
homosexuality as “a sexual deviancy often accompanied by disorders that have dire 
consequences for our culture.”  Id. at 267. 
 296  
Today’s opinion is the product of a Court, which is the product of a 
law-profession culture, that has largely signed on the so-called 
homosexual agenda, by which I mean the agenda promoted by some 
homosexual activist directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that 
has traditionally attached to homosexuals conduct.  I noted in an 
earlier opinion the fact that the American Association of Law Schools 
(to which any reputable law school must seek to belong) excludes from 
membership any school that refuses to ban from its job-interview 
facilities a law firm (no matter how small) that does not wish to hire as 
a prospective partner a person who openly engages in homosexual 
conduct. 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).  For more on 
the “homosexual agenda” see Peter LaBarbera, 11 Ways You Can Fight the Homosexual 
Agenda, A CWA RESOURCE, July 1, 2003, available at 
http://www.cwfa.org/images/content/11ways.pdf (providing suggestions such as  
“[e]ducate your family, co-workers, and friends about the homosexual agenda; Speak 
out against ‘sexual orientation’ laws; Lobby corporation shareholder activism.”). 
 297 See Appeal Begins for Teen Sentenced to Prison for Gay Sex, supra note 36. 
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Pedophiles will still be punished; the Romeo and Juliet law does not 
protect them.  Further, these arguments were put forth in Lawrence 
and explicitly rejected by the United States Supreme Court.298  
Therefore, while age of consent laws and mitigating statutes such as 
Kansas’s Romeo and Juliet law are valid and reasonable ways to 
regulate teenage sexual exploration and activities, Kansas has not put 
forth compelling justification why such protections should not extend 
to homosexual teenagers as well.  Thus, applying this analysis, 
Kansas’s Romeo and Juliet law should be ruled unconstitutional.  
Although minors do not have an absolute privacy right and thus may 
not receive Lawrence’s complete Due Process protection,299 Lawrence 
declared that homosexuality is no longer a crime.  As a result, 
homosexual relations, even teenage relations, should not be subject 
to harsher penalties.  It follows that Lawrence v. Texas300 and Kansas v. 
Limon301 should be used to invalidate such discriminatory laws on the 
basis that they are unconstitutional. 
Therefore, even though Limon may have several differences 
from Lawrence, Limon must derive similar benefits.302  Although it was 
only the concurring opinion in Lawrence that advanced the Equal 
Protection argument, the majority did not reject this argument.  In 
fact, the majority recognized it as “tenable.”303  Likewise, the fact that 
the Supreme Court decided Lawrence upon Due Process grounds, 
rather than Equal Protection, does not necessarily serve as a 
limitation.304  Even prior to Lawrence, the Equal Protection Clause had 
 
 298 See supra Part II. 
 299 See supra Part II. 
 300 See supra Part IV. 
 301 Kansas v. Limon, 83 P.3d at 236. 
 302 See Greenhouse, supra note 14.  “While Mr. Limon’s challenge to the Kansas 
law was based on equal protection, and the majority opinion in the Texas case was 
based not on that constitutional ground but on due process, it was evidently 
sweeping enough to encompass equal protection cases as well.”  Id. (citing Matthew 
Coles, with the ACLU gay and lesbian rights project).  “It’s an example of how much 
is now going to open up,” Coles added, “[w]hen the court finds that gay relationships 
are protected by the Constitution, it’s answering the equality questions as well.”  Id. 
 303 Lawrence, 539 U.S. 574. 
 304 See Elmer, supra note 1. 
In bringing Lawrence to the Supreme Court, the gay-rights forces found 
themselves on the horns of an exquisite dilemma . . . . Should the gay 
rights side argue substantive due process, a disfavored doctrine that 
had been soundly rejected in Bowers?  Or should they argue equal 
protection despite the uphill battle in trying to get to any form of 
heightened scrutiny?  Many amicus curice [sic] briefs were filed with the 
Supreme Court.  Interestingly, the one filed by a wide range of lesbian 
and gay legal advocacy groups, including, among many others, the 
National Lesbian and Gay Law Association, Gaylaw, the Lesbian and 
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been successfully used to protect homosexual rights.305  As set forth 
below, however, homosexual challenges to the Equal Protection 
Clause also contain many uncertainties. 
C. Romer: Equal Protection 
Because the Court decided Lawrence on Due Process privacy 
grounds, the decision gave the Kansas Court of Appeals an “escape 
hatch” through which it could refuse to apply Lawrence to Limon, as 
Limon involved an Equal Protection challenge.  Although Limon is 
distinguishable from Lawrence in this respect, Limon can serve not 
only as an interpretation of Lawrence, but also as a clarification of the 
ambiguities of another breakthrough case, Romer v. Evans.306 
 
Gay Law Association of Greater New York, the Lesbian and Gay Law 
Association of Los Angeles, chose to argue only on equal protection 
grounds.  In their amicus brief, the lesbian and gay lawyers associations 
made a calculated tactical decision that the substantive due process 
argument was too risky and, consequently, argued equal protection 
only. 
Id. (emphasis in original).  Elmer further added: 
[T]he Court had a narrow ground upon which it could have struck 
down the Texas statute, equal protection.  Justice O’Connor was 
right—the law did discriminate based on gender.  In deliberately 
choosing not to rely on equal protection, but rather to ground its ruling 
on substantive due process, the Court went against its own general rule 
of avoiding difficult constitutional issues if there are simpler ways of 
deciding a case.  Moreover, the Court was explicit in explaining that 
the reason it chose not to rely on equal protection is that then Georgia-
style anti-sodomy laws would not come within the ambit of the decision.  
That is, the Court wanted to reach out and make a far broader ruling 
than was, strictly speaking, necessary.  Equally important, is the Court’s 
decision to rely on substantive due process may breathe a bit of fresh 
life into the languishing doctrine. 
Id. at 9.  See also Greenhouse, supra note 14.  “While Mr. Limon’s challenge to the 
Kansas law was based on equal protection, and the majority opinion in the Texas case 
was based not on that constitutional ground but on due process, it was evidently 
sweeping enough to encompass equal protection cases as well.”  Id.  Further, this is 
“an example of how much is now going to open up . . . [w]hen the court finds that 
gay relationships are protected by the Constitution, it’s answering the equality 
questions as well.”  Id. 
 305 See Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (invalidating an amendment to Colorado’s constitution 
which named as a solitary class persons who were homosexuals, lesbians, or bisexual 
either by “orientation, conduct, practices or relationships,” and deprived them of 
protection under state anti-discrimination laws).  The Supreme Court concluded that 
the provision was “born of animosity toward the class of persons affected” and 
further that “it had no rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose.”  Id. at 
634, cited in Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 584 (“In Romer . . . we refused to sanction a law that 
singled out homosexuals for ‘disfavored legal status.’ . . . The same is true here.  The 
Equal Protection Clause ‘neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.’”  
(citations omitted)). 
 306 517 U.S. 620. 
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The level of scrutiny applicable to sexual orientation has long 
been debated.  In 1996, the United States Supreme Court came close 
to addressing this issue.307  In Romer v. Evans,308 the Court, for the first 
time, invalidated discrimination based on sexual orientation.309  Romer 
involved a challenge to a proposed amendment to the Colorado 
constitution.310  The amendment repealed all state and local laws that 
prohibited discrimination against homosexuals, as well as prohibit 
future protective laws.311  Romer asserted that even when a justification 
is presented as a purported moral basis for a law, animus against gays 
and lesbians is not a valid justification.312  Further, while the United 
States Supreme Court did not openly reach the question of whether 
sexual orientation deserves heightened scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause, “it held that the proposed amendment failed to 
pass constitutional muster even under rational review, a weaker 
standard of judicial scrutiny.”313  Thus, although the standard lacked 
clarity and the Court seemed to apply only a rational basis standard of 
review, the decision indicated some judicial willingness to use the 
Equal Protection Clause to protect homosexuals from 
discrimination.314 
Several scholars have interpreted Romer as proposing “that the 
Court is . . . applying a . . . heightened standard of review to sexual 
orientation classifications, one either equivalent to the intermediate 
scrutiny standard of review it applies to sex classifications, or a 
standard in between mere rational review and intermediate 
scrutiny.”315  The Supreme Court, however, has never explicitly 
declared which standard applies, contributing to uncertainty.  If 
Limon does make its way back to the Supreme Court,316 the Court can 
finally declare which standard of scrutiny applies.  Thus, Limon can 
 
 307 See Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay 
Rights, 49 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 471, 483 (2001).  Note that in Rowland v. Mad River Local 
School District, in a dissent to a denial of a writ of certiorari, Justice William Brennan, 
joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall, argued that “discrimination against 
homosexuals . . . raises significant constitutional questions under . . . equal 
protection analysis.”  470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  However, 
because this is a dissent, it has no precedential value. 
 308 517 U.S. 620. 
 309 Id. 
 310 Id. at 623. 
 311 Id. 
 312 Id. at 644. 
 313 Stein, supra note 307, at 483. 
 314 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 9.7.4., at 
759 (2d ed. 2002). 
 315 See Stein, supra note 307, at 483. 
 316 See supra text accompanying note 39. 
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serve to settle this ongoing dispute. 
The significance of both Lawrence and Limon cannot be 
understated; scholars have seen a “historic parallel” in the early 
judicial reaction to Lawrence to that of Brown v. Board of Education.317  
Fifty years ago, in the aftermath of the legendary case of Brown v. 
Board of Education318—which declared segregation of public schools 
unconstitutional—some judges “interpreted Brown narrowly, ignored 
it, or even defied it – until the Court forcefully ruled in Cooper v. 
Aaron319 in 1958 that its Brown mandate could no longer be 
resisted.”320  Likewise, today “[we are] in very much a 1956-type 
historical setting, where the previous paradigm of inequality is 
suddenly upended and a surprising new mandate of full equality is 
ordered . . . .”321  Limon may parallel the effect of Cooper by resolving 
the ambiguities of Lawrence322 and thereby prevent states from 
indirectly regulating homosexuals, fill in the blanks of Romer v. 
Evans,323 and release Mathew Limon from his seventeen-year jail term. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Lawrence was thought to be a sweeping victory; it opened up 
doors in the gay movement and granted a number of rights, all which 
seemed unattainable under the previous Bowers regime.  New hope 
now exists for advocates of gay marriage, gay adoption, and various 
other homosexual issues.  While the Court in Lawrence clearly 
extended a right to engage in homosexual activity to adults, Limon 
poses an even more controversial issue—should this right extend to 
minors? 
Such an issue is crucial at this point in time: the Limon case is a 
“test case” to determine how far Lawrence will be interpreted.  A 
positive outcome will not only grant teenagers the freedom to live a 
homosexual lifestyle, but also send out a positive hope for the future, 
allowing them to feel accepted rather than criminal.  Furthermore, 
Limon can serve as a preventative measure for a state backlash that 
could minimize Lawrence’s triumph; Limon can prohibit states from 
raising the age of consent for homosexual activity, as Europe has 
done.  A decision favoring Limon will send out the message that 
 
 317 Mauro, supra note 189, at 1. 
 318 349 U.S. 294 (1954). 
 319 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 320 Mauro, supra note 189, at 1. 
 321 Id. 
 322 539 U.S. 558. 
 323 517 U.S. 620. 
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Lawrence, is in fact, a “sweeping” victory for gay rights. 
Further, even if Lawrence does not directly control Limon, 
independent grounds exist for Limon’s immediate release.  The 
Romeo and Juliet law, as applied, is unconstitutional because it grants 
heterosexuals more protection than homosexuals, even though they 
have committed the same crime.  Therefore, in Limon, the Kansas 
Supreme Court, once again, has the opportunity to extend the 
Lawrence decision to protect young adults, and in the revolutionary 
aftermath of Lawrence, it may have to do so. 
Finally, the Lawrence victory so far has been less than triumphant, 
with many setbacks, including Limon.  Whether courts should 
interpret Lawrence broadly or narrowly has still not been decided, and 
lower courts are currently divided on this issue.  Eventually, one of 
these cases interpreting Lawrence narrowly may make its way back to 
the United States Supreme Court.  Limon may be a good case for the 
Court to decide because it poses an opportunity to clarify Lawrence’s 
analysis, as well as articulate that a heightened standard of scrutiny 
should apply in laws differentiating between heterosexuals and 
homosexuals.  Depending on the Supreme Court’s composition at 
the time of consideration, however, the Court may expand Lawrence 
or further limit it. 
 
